Suppressing the Great Awakening:
Alexander Garden’s Use of Anti-Popery Against George Whitefield

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Compared with the inhabitants of other mainland British colonies, South Carolinians—even members of the white elite—produced relatively few statements of ideology or extensive discussions of current affairs. Consequently, reconstructing the worldview of South Carolinians in the early-eighteenth century can be a challenge. Fortunately, the normal reticence of South Carolinians was broken by Alexander Garden, head of the Church of England in the colony, when he attacked George Whitefield during the Great Awakening. Garden delivered several sermons and published numerous tracts against the evangelist between 1740 and 1742. His works constitute the first extensive, published, ideological discourse by a resident South Carolinian. This discourse, which touches on more than just religious matters, delineates the framework of values and phobias through which Garden and his readers interpreted the world around them. Surprisingly, Garden’s works have attracted little attention. Historians who have mentioned them at all have generally failed to analyze their content. Yet, on close investigation, Garden’s attacks on Whitefield reveal themselves as complex, clever, and surprising—especially in their insistence that Whitefield was an agent of the Roman Catholic Church.

Alexander Garden was born in 1685 in Aberdeenshire, Scotland, and earned his M.A. at the University of Aberdeen in 1711. After holding a curacy in a London parish, he migrated to Charleston in 1720, where he ended up spending the bulk of his adult life. In his new home, he took up a post as curate of St. Philip’s, soon rising to be rector. The Bishop of London, whose diocese included all of British America, began to treat Garden as his unofficial agent from 1723, and six years later promoted Garden to the official position of commissary, or episcopal representative. Garden settled in thoroughly to life in Charleston. He worked well with the vestry of St. Philip’s and was also influential with the colony’s Assembly. He married and sired five children in South Carolina, and he also accumulated considerable property. When he retired from his duties as commissary and as parish priest, he made his final home in the colony, where he died in 1756. Given his successful and prominent role among the influential leaders of South Carolina, Garden’s publications can provide us with a valuable perspective on how elite, white South Carolinians saw their colony’s position in the world during the years around 1740.
At the start of the public debate between Garden and Whitefield, the commis-
sary presided over a Church of England that counted about 45 percent of South
Carolina’s white population among its members. The rest of the colony’s whites be-
longed to one of the colony’s Dissenting sects, the most numerous of which were the
Huguenots, Congregationalists, and Baptists. The Church of England was legally
established, and it therefore received financial support from South Carolina’s gov-
ernment. Dissenters were not only tolerated, as they were in England, but they also
enjoyed additional rights of voting and holding public office, unlike their counter-
parts in the mother country. This distribution of privilege and power between the
Church of England and the Dissenters had been reached only after a protracted
political controversy that had embroiled the colony during the first two decades of
the eighteenth century. Any aggressive or tactless action by either religious group
could easily re-ignite old passions.

Even within Garden’s Church of England, there were varying theological stand-
points. The majority of the clergy inclined, to a greater or lesser degree, to an
Arminian position: these clerics believed that man, by freely choosing to obey the
moral precepts of Scripture and the church, and by engaging in formal worship
according to the church’s liturgy, could fulfill God’s conditions for salvation. By con-
trast, about one-third of the established church’s clergy in South Carolina were Cal-
vinists, who believed that man’s fate in the afterlife was predestined and that no
decision or action on earth could alter that fate. Among this Calvinist group were
former Dissenters, especially French Huguenots, who had accepted the authority of
the Church of England. In addition to these doctrinal distinctions, another charac-
teristic of the established church in South Carolina was that many of the clergy were
funded by the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel (S.P.G.), a missionary orga-
nization based in England, but with its chief focus on the American colonies. The
S.P.G. had been founded with the twin goals of combating Quaker and Catholic
influence in America and cooperating with non-Quaker Dissenters. Although some
members of the S.P.G. did not always adhere to the second of these original goals,
many did, believing that the Protestant cause would only be weakened by strife be-
tween members of different denominations. Garden thus presided over a church
that contained many members who were either Calvinists themselves, or who were
dedicated to the principle of cooperation with Calvinist Dissenters.

Whitefield threatened to disrupt this delicate balance between Dissenters and
Anglicans, and between Calvinists and non-Calvinists within the Church of England.
In his sermons, both oral and printed, and in his published Journal, the evangelist
made a number of attacks on the Anglican clergy. One such attack charged that the
clergy led worldly lives and that they were too ready to condone worldliness in their congregations. A serious example of this worldliness was the clergy’s readiness to condone the cruelty of slave owners towards their slaves while doing nothing to convert those slaves to Christianity. Whitefield also claimed that most of the clergy were preaching a doctrine of “works,” i.e. the idea that man could earn salvation through his own virtuous actions. Such a doctrine, said Whitefield, was clearly in disagreement with the Articles of the Church of England, which laid down Calvinist principles with regard to man’s salvation. Whitefield attacked the Anglican clergy not only for preaching false ideas about salvation but also for recommending that their congregations read Arminian publications, such as Richard Allestree’s Whole Duty of Man and the sermons of John Tillotson. These works, lamented Whitefield, were “Anti-Christian Compositions” that taught nothing better than “Compliance with the vilest Practices of the Idolatrous Heathens.”

Whitefield’s attacks presented Garden with a serious challenge. According to one historian, William Kenney, the evangelist placed Garden in an impossible situation: if the commissary ignored Whitefield, the authority of the Church of England would be compromised, and the Dissenters of South Carolina would be emboldened to renew their attack on its privileges. On the other hand, by choosing to take bold action against Whitefield, Kenney argues, Garden appeared as a tyrant, and he alienated himself and the Anglican hierarchy from the Calvinist mainstream in South Carolina and elsewhere in the colonies. In this situation, Garden could not win. The commissary’s dilemma, concludes this scholar, resulted from a larger fact of life in the colonies: established churches could not prosper in the egalitarian and religiously diverse conditions that prevailed in America.

Kenney’s interpretation of the Garden-Whitefield confrontation is mistaken on a number of counts: first, he characterizes the relationship between the established church and the Dissenters as crudely confrontational, whereas in fact it was more complex; second, he fails to appreciate the subtlety of Garden’s counterattack against Whitefield contained in Garden’s published critiques of the evangelist’s activities; and finally, Kenney does not account for the fact that Whitefield’s following, which was robust in early 1740, shrank to almost nothing a year later. Indeed, Charleston became the only example of a major colonial city where the evangelist failed to make permanent headway.

The following analysis of Garden’s actions and writings attempts to demonstrate that Garden handled Whitefield in a politically astute fashion, and that the commissary successfully deflected the challenge posed by the evangelist. The key element in Garden’s strategy was his determination to avoid identifying the evangelist with
Calvinism, so that any attack on Whitefield also became an attack on the theological views of a majority of white South Carolinians. Garden did not want to drive the significant number of Calvinists in the Church of England out of the church, nor did he want to antagonize Dissenters, whose political rights gave them the potential to weaken the Anglican establishment’s privileges in the colony.\textsuperscript{15}

Garden’s counter-attack against Whitefield took two forms. As commissary, Garden had the power to convene an ecclesiastical court to discipline errant Church of England clergy. Accordingly, Garden convened the court on 15 July 1740. The charges brought against Whitefield avoided any mention of the evangelist’s doctrine. On 18 July, the court found Whitefield guilty of failing to use an approved form of worship in his religious meetings and of preaching outside his parish without a license. The evangelist was suspended from preaching, but the implementation of the sentence was delayed for a year since Whitefield demanded the right to appeal to the Bishop of London. When Whitefield failed to appeal the court’s sentence in the allotted time, he was duly suspended, on 19 July 1741.\textsuperscript{16} By that date, the evangelist had long left the colony. The court’s sentence, however, did succeed in making the point to all clergy and laity who respected the principle of authority in the Church of England that Whitefield did not have the backing of the Anglican hierarchy.

Garden’s second course of action against Whitefield was to preach from the pulpit of St. Philip’s, Charleston. Between 1740 and 1742 Garden published three of these sermons along with two series of letters attacking the evangelist. Since Garden repeated many of the same themes in all his works against Whitefield, it is easier to approach Garden’s publications on a thematic basis, rather than work by work, to see how each of his themes was fashioned to appeal to a wide spectrum of Protestant readers. One of Garden’s major tasks was to refute Whitefield’s claim that the Arminian doctrines held by Garden and by a majority of the Church of England clergy in the colony constituted a doctrine of “works,” i.e. a belief that man could earn salvation through his own merit without the need for Christ’s sacrifice or God’s grace. Garden defended his views by stressing that man’s good actions only fulfilled a limited set of conditions laid down by God for salvation after God had forgiven the bulk of man’s sins: man had to take a few small steps of his own, but he largely depended on God’s mercy for salvation. Such a theology, Garden argued, was entirely consistent with the Articles of the Church of England, and Whitefield slandered the clergy by claiming that they had departed from the teachings of that church.\textsuperscript{17}

Having defended his own position, Garden was unwilling to leave Whitefield
looking like a champion of Calvinism. Garden’s attack on the evangelist therefore included denunciations of Whitefield’s own inconsistency on the question of how far men could influence their own salvation. According to the commissary, Whitefield himself sometimes preached an essentially Arminian doctrine. In fact, one of the most distinctive features of the evangelist’s ministry, the open-air meetings in which Whitefield preached to thousands, even tens of thousands, of listeners, relied on the notion that man could take action towards winning his own salvation. Satirically, Garden asked Whitefield whether urging the crowds who flocked to hear him to “fast, weep, howl, sing, read Scripture, [and] hear Sermons” was not urging them to do good works? This point was a telling one. The antics of those who came to hear Whitefield were well-known on both sides of the Atlantic. Whitefield publicized them in his Journal, while the authorities of the Church of England attacked them as spiritually meaningless bouts of hysteria. Garden thus managed to turn the hallmark of the evangelist’s ministry into evidence of the evangelist’s inconsistency and hypocrisy: Whitefield, by urging the public to come in droves to hear him and be saved, was preaching a doctrine of “works.” Not only did this practice disqualify him from calling himself a Calvinist it also made his denunciations of Arminians in the Church of England look dishonest.

Equally dishonest, according to Garden, were Whitefield’s criticisms of the Anglican clergy’s failure to bring Christianity to the African slaves. In the summer of 1740, the evangelist published his Letter to the Inhabitants of Maryland, Virginia, North- and South-Carolina, in which he attacked slave owners for mistreating their slaves and for failing to Christianize them. In this document, Whitefield warned that God will punish these slave-owning societies, possibly by stirring up a slave revolt. Garden attacked this tract of Whitefield’s as dishonest and disruptive. The commissary stressed that the evangelist’s views, though poorly expressed, were essentially in agreement with those of the Church of England. Garden agreed with Whitefield that owners did wrong when they treated their slaves cruelly and that more efforts should indeed be made to convert the slaves. The commissary pointed out that his superior, the Bishop of London, had recently made the same points in his Second Pastoral Letter, to which Whitefield’s tract added no substantive arguments. Whitefield’s only real purpose seemed to be to stir up trouble by slandering all slave owners as monsters, by falsely accusing all Church of England clergy of being unconcerned with the slaves’ salvation, and by publicly discussing a major slave uprising in a manner that might actually provoke one.

Whitefield’s complaints about the Anglican clergy’s theology and its failure to evangelize made even less sense, Garden argued, given the fact that Whitefield insisted
on remaining a member of the established church. If Whitefield was truly unhappy with what was being taught and done in the Church of England, if he truly felt, as he said he did, that the Anglican clergy was guilty of “leading the People to the Gates of Hell,” then he should simply leave the church and become a Dissenter. The fact that Whitefield picked groundless quarrels with his fellow clergymen and then insisted on remaining in a church he professed to despise suggested underhand purposes. If Whitefield was neither consistently Arminian nor Calvinist, if he was unhappy with the Church of England and yet not a member of any Dissenting denomination, what did the evangelist believe? What was his religious affiliation?

Garden answered these questions by labeling Whitefield an “enthusiast” and by demonstrating that this “enthusiasm” linked him, in terms of both his theology and his disruptive evangelizing methods, to the Roman Catholic Church. Throughout his polemics, Garden of course used the term “enthusiasm” in its eighteenth-century sense, defining it as:

Forsaking the ordinary Ways and Means of attaining the knowledge of our Religious Duty, viz. Natural Reason and the written Word of God; and substituting in their Place our own Conceits of immediate Revelations, . . . [springing from] certain Impulses, Motions, or Impressions of the Holy Spirit on our Minds, without any rational objective Evidence, or clear and efficient Proof.

Such “enthusiasm,” claimed Garden, was difficult to combat, because when enthusiasts were accused of beliefs that were contrary to Scripture and reason, they simply claimed that the unregenerate were unable to “see and judge of spiritual Things,” and that only those in whom the Spirit dwelt could perceive the Spirit’s truth. How could anyone argue against a man who claimed to be “a special Messenger sent forth from God, and therefore not bound to give Proofs and Reasons of his Message”? “Sure[ly],” exclaimed Garden, this was “a compendious Method to stop every Mouth; [to] shut out all the Powers of Argument and Reason . . . !”

Enthusiasm not only opened the door to error, but also to dangerous antisocial and immoral behavior. After all, once a person began to believe that he was divinely inspired and began to ignore reason, where would his delusions end? Ultimately, there could be “No Reveries so monstrous or absurd, which shall not be deemed Divine Impulses or Inspirations! No Practices so wicked or immoral, which shall not be justified as Fruits or Effects of these [impulses]! If the wicked Fancy, Conceit, or Inclination be, to commit Murder, Adultery, or Incest, etc., it is [claimed to be] the Impulse of the Spirit, the Command of God, and it shall be committed.”

Garden represented this “enthusiasm” as typical of many religious extremists,
suggesting parallels between Whitefield and sectarians like “the Oliverians, Ranters, Quakers, French Prophets,” and with religious leaders like “Mahomet, Muncer, Fox, Nailor, and Muggleton.”

Yet while Garden cast his net broadly to find insulting comparisons for Whitefield, no comparison appeared more frequently or was fleshed out in greater detail than Garden’s likening of the evangelist’s beliefs to Roman Catholicism. More importantly, while Garden never claimed that Whitefield was actually a Quaker or a Muslim, Garden did argue that Whitefield might be an active member of the Catholic Church.

Garden drew on a well-developed tradition in the eighteenth-century Church of England when he equated Catholics and “enthusiasts” as men who denied reason and scripture and who relied on unrestrained internal impulses. A trait of Whitefield’s that was both “enthusiastic” and “popish” was his tendency to preach in an authoritarian rather than a rational manner, a practice typical of those who believed themselves to possess infallible guidance. Garden warned his readers about Whitefield and his fellow Methodists, who approached the masses by:

- cramming [doctrine] down their Throats with Anathema’s, Hell and Damnation at the End of them, on all that will not implicitly receive them; in this Case, I say, be we sure, that such are either Men of enthusiastick Heads, or Emissaries of Rome.

More specifically, Garden argued that Whitefield’s method of debate was reminiscent of Jesuit techniques:

- It is a Maxim, I am told, among the Jesuits in Controversy, never to regard the Arguments or Objections of an Adversary; but to neglect them, and always return to their own Assertion, as if nothing had been offered against it. A Maxim worthy indeed of that singular Order! Do you not also pursue this Trick of theirs in your Polemicks? Did you learn it of them? Or is it the Fruit of your own Genius?

Indeed, the apparent lack of consistency in Whitefield’s teachings, which Garden pointed out time and time again, was typical of “popery”:

- Beware, my Brethren, this is an arrant Jumble of Contradiction and Confusion, either calculated by a Romish EMISSARY, to distract and confound weak Minds; or the Produce of a warm, fanatick, Enthusiastick Brain.

Catholic emissaries had a deep purpose for preaching such inconsistent and confusing doctrines:
We know Rome has her Seed and Harvest Missionaries. Her Seedmen sow INFIDELITY and ENTHUSIASM, to distress and unsettle weak Minds, often to Distraction; and then appear the Harvest Men; to heal their Wounds, and gather them home into the Bosom of their Mother, from whom they had gone astray.  

Garden made these charges more than once, lamenting that so many, by following Whitefield, were:

throwing themselves into the Arms of a strong Delusion!—a Harvest indeed for Romish Missionaries! For who knows not, that this [practice], of laying aside Reason, is a first Doctrine of Popery, the main Foundation of the terrible Fabrick of Rome?  

Thus, Whitefield’s “enthusiasm” held the key to categorizing the evangelist’s beliefs and ultimate religious affiliation: the evangelist, wittingly or unwittingly, was acting according to the purposes of Rome.  

Garden himself was not immune from being accused of “popery.” As the local head of an established church, and especially as the convener of an ecclesiastical court that brought Whitefield to trial, Garden was very vulnerable to such accusations. On occasion, Whitefield tried to exploit this vulnerability. In his Journal, Whitefield compared Garden’s summons to the ecclesiastical court to a “Pope’s Bull.” The evangelist also played with Garden’s name to evoke images of Stephen Gardiner, the persecuting bishop of Mary Tudor’s reign, who was known to eighteenth-century colonists from the widely-read works of John Foxe, the sixteenth-century martyrologist. Yet Garden proved himself to be more than a match for Whitefield when it came to employing anti-Catholic stereotypes to tarnish his opponent. Garden’s polemics were larded with cleverly manipulated images that turned Whitefield’s accusations against him into further grounds for suspecting the evangelist of “popery.”  

In his Third Letter, Garden recalled that Whitefield had boasted in his Journal that evangelical preaching against unregenerate ministers had “kindled a Fire which all the Devils in Hell shall not be able to Extinguish!” To this claim, Garden retorted:

Alas, (Sir) the Fire you have kindled is that of Slander and Defamation. A Fire! which no Devil in Hell, no nor no Jesuit nor Deist on Earth, will ever go about to Extinguish; but fagot and foment it with all their Might, as [all] too effectually serving their Interests. . . .  

In this passage, Garden skillfully took Whitefield’s own metaphor of a fire and turned it against the evangelist by invoking images of Catholics stoking the fires of
persecution, images that were familiar to British Americans from works like Foxe’s Acts and Monuments.\textsuperscript{36} It is true that here Garden mentioned Deists as well as Jesuits as enemies who might make use of Whitefield’s slanders against the Church of England, but the image of adding fagots to a fire would have made the anti-Catholic element of this passage paramount to readers: Deists were thought of more as detached intellectuals than as active persecutors.

Garden built on the anti-Catholic imagery of this passage as he proceeded with his attack. Clearly the commissary assumed that his talk of Jesuits stoking a bonfire would bring the idea of persecution into his readers’ minds, for after the passage quoted above, in what to us but not to an eighteenth-century reader would seem to be something of a non sequitur, he immediately continued his denunciation of Whitefield as follows:

You and your Brethren cry out Persecution! ‘Tis true, Persecution there is in the Case; but are you not the Persecutors? Is it not you that falsely accuse the Brethren; disturb the Peace of the Church; and trample on her Laws and Canons (though solemnly engaged to obey them), and despise her Authority? But still Persecution you cry out; for Want of it you mean; for Ours is no persecuting Country for Religion; every Man may enjoy his own Way in Peace and Safety. . . .

Garden then suggested that Whitefield and his associates might like to go to Spain, Portugal, or to the Native Americans if they so greatly desired to be persecuted.\textsuperscript{37} In this passage, Garden not only evoked the idea of Whitefield as an oath breaker, another anti-Catholic stereotype common in the eighteenth-century British Empire, but also suggested a hidden motive behind Whitefield’s claim that the authorities, including Garden, were persecuting him. By deriding the evangelist’s claim of persecution and suggesting that the evangelist go outside the British Empire to find out what persecution really was, Garden might well have struck a patriotic nerve in his readers. Given the war that was in progress between Britain and Spain, and given the widespread pride in the colonies about British liberty, Whitefield’s attempt to equate the behavior of the Church of England with that of the Catholic Church in Spain could only seem to be in poor taste and nonsensical, trivializing the ideological gulf that separated the British Empire from its Catholic foes. Taken as a whole, this section of the Third Letter suggested that Whitefield, by attempting to equate Garden with “popish” tyrants, was only trying to sow dissension in the Church of England. Since that dissension would benefit Catholic schemes, Whitefield’s cry of persecution actually aligned him with the Church of Rome.
While Garden attacked Whitefield on many grounds, the heart of his attack was his claim that the evangelist was a witting or unwitting agent of the Catholic Church. The importance of the charges of “popery” lay not just in their frequent appearance but in the way that Whitefield’s “popish” behavior and affiliations served to explain so many aspects of the evangelist’s activities. The notion of Whitefield as an emissary of Rome bound all Garden’s other charges into a coherent whole. It was “popish” to sow dissension among members of the Church of England, “popish” to discourage rational debate and to encourage reliance on supposedly infallible, “enthusiastic” impulses, and, conceivably, it was “popish” to invite slave uprisings through tactless and pointless remarks. Thus the idea of Whitefield as a Catholic agent was at the logical center of Garden’s portrait of the evangelist.

These extraordinary charges seem too far-fetched to take seriously today. Their prominence in Garden’s attack, however, should not be surprising. The pervasive importance of anti-Catholicism in the eighteenth-century British Empire has been demonstrated by a number of recent scholars, who argue that anti-popery was a major source of identity for Britons and British Americans up until the time of the American Revolution. In the context of these cultural prejudices and philosophical assumptions, Garden’s charges would have made sense to his auditors and readers. Therefore these accusations, however ridiculous they might seem to us, should not be passed over as they have been in previous discussions of the Great Awakening in South Carolina.

There is no doubt about the prominence of the theme of Whitefield as “papist” in Garden’s published writings. A more difficult question to answer is: what impact did these accusations of “popery” have on the readers of these texts? The answer to this question may lie in Whitefield’s sudden loss of reputation in the second half of 1740. In the middle of that year, the evangelist’s popularity was at its peak, according to both his own and Garden’s accounts, but by early 1741, when he was arrested for libel and released on bail, the evangelist was in disgrace. Lacking confidence in the outcome of his trial, Whitefield fled the colony before his court date. What caused this sudden reversal of fortune?

Harvey Jackson has offered an explanation of Whitefield’s fall that focuses on white South Carolinians’ racial fears. Jackson argues that Whitefield’s close association with Hugh Bryan, a planter who founded a school for teaching Christianity to slaves, tarnished the evangelist’s reputation in the eyes of a broad segment of the colony’s elite. There are, however, problems with Jackson’s argument. Whitefield published his attack on southern slave owners in the summer of 1740. Yet his reputation in Charleston reached its apogee after that date. When Whitefield was later arrested, it was before Bryan’s slave school had really got off the ground. Moreover, Garden also started a
school for teaching Christianity to the slaves during the 1740s without suffering any loss of standing with the elite. Given these facts, racial fears do not explain sufficiently the sudden hostility encountered by Whitefield at the end of 1740.

On the other hand, Garden’s identification of the evangelist with Roman Catholicism might offer a better unraveling of what was going on in South Carolinians’ minds. Garden delivered a barrage of sermons and published most of the documents examined above between the summer of 1740, when Whitefield’s popularity was strong, and the end of the year, when the evangelist fell into disgrace. The theme of “popery” in Garden’s sermons was certainly a topical one: stories about the threat from Catholic Spain filled the South-Carolina Gazette, which at this time printed more reports about the war than about any other topic. Moreover, white South Carolinians knew well that Spanish authorities in St. Augustine had been encouraging slaves to escape from South Carolina and to find freedom under Spanish rule. Many in the colony blamed Spain for the Stono Rebellion of 1739. Garden’s ability to link Whitefield’s beliefs and practices to well-established Catholic stereotypes, coming in the context of real and perceived Catholic threats, must have alarmed many of those who were not utterly committed to the evangelist. Whether or not Garden’s readers accepted the notion that Whitefield was literally a papal emissary, Garden certainly had ensured that the public image of Whitefield was overshadowed by familiar anti-Catholic stereotypes that were deeply embedded in Anglo-Protestant culture. Once the notion of Whitefield as “papist” had been planted, the Great Awakening could be conceived of as part of a Catholic plot to plunge South Carolina into chaos, a plot that could include military invasion and slave insurrections.

This analysis of Garden’s attack on Whitefield arrives at some unusual conclusions about the way that white South Carolinians of the mid-eighteenth century viewed the world around them. While most historians have argued that race was the fundamental factor in the mental world of the colony’s elite, this paper stresses the colonists’ anti-Catholicism. To some extent, these different conclusions are the result of different methodologies. Social historians, focusing on demographic data, have been impressed by the fact that white South Carolinians in 1740 were a small minority in a society that was overwhelmingly African. Such historians have assumed that objective demographic facts must have been fundamental in shaping whites’ worldview. By contrast, I have relied on discourse analysis, a tool of cultural history. Cultural historians stress that objective reality is heavily interpreted by historical subjects who view the world around them through a cultural lens that magnifies some objects, diminishes others, and colors all of them according to the values of the particular cultural system. Garden’s discourse about Whitefield suggests that he and his readers were
viewing their New World context through cultural spectacles brought over from Europe. Through these spectacles, the small Spanish garrison at St. Augustine loomed large, overshadowing the more numerous population of enslaved Africans. This population was visible to Garden, but its significance was understood in terms of Old World value systems: Garden feared the African majority as the possible agents of Catholic mischief-making rather than as a threat in its own right. Of course, Garden was but a single individual within the white elite population, albeit a well-connected and influential individual. It is possible to question how far his worldview was shared by all South Carolina whites. Still, Garden’s attack on the evangelist, unusual for its extensive insights into contemporary value systems, suggests one broad conclusion: there may be ways of interpreting eighteenth-century South Carolina history other than the-now-traditional, race-centered view.

ENDNOTES

1. For an example of this dismissive treatment, see Frank Lambert, Inventing the Great Awakening (Princeton University, 1999), 143; and John Frederick Woolverton, Colonial Anglicanism in North America (Detroit: Wayne State University, 1984), 193–94. William Howland Kenney III, who has published the most detailed account of the confrontation between Garden and Whitefield, focused on Garden’s legal action against the evangelist, but omitted any examination of Garden’s verbal attacks: see “Alexander Garden and George Whitefield: the Significance of Revivalism in South Carolina, 1738–1741,” in The South Carolina Historical Magazine, vol. 71 (1970), 1–16. James Barney Hawkins has provided the most extensive summary of Garden’s polemics against Whitefield in his unpublished dissertation, Alexander Garden: the Commissary in Church and State (Duke University, 1981), 146–75. Hawkins does not attempt an analysis of Garden’s ideas, however, nor does he examine Garden’s use of anti-popery against the evangelist.

2. Garden’s career path was quite typical for a Church of England clergyman in the eighteenth-century colonies. The colonies were often served by clergy who originated from Scotland, Ireland, Wales, or the north of England, regions on the periphery of the Church of England’s power base. Woolverton, Colonial Anglicanism, 27.


15. Garden himself had worked hard to bring Huguenots into the established church. Hawkins, Alexander Garden, 120–121.


18. Ibid., 9.


20. For a few examples of Whitefield’s descriptions of his open-air preaching, see his Journals, 261–64, 343–45, 421–23; for an account of the Church of England’s reaction, see Lambert, Inventing the Great Awakening, 206–21.


23. Ibid., 21–22.


25. Ibid., 3, 23.


27. Ibid., 3, 12. The Oliverians were the radical followers of Oliver Cromwell, who overturned the Anglican establishment and ruled England from 1649–1658. Ranters in Cromwell’s time were an extreme sect who believed it was wrong to adhere to moral laws. The Quakers, in their early days as an emerging sect under Cromwell’s rule, frequently vilified other Protestant denominations and threatened the established order. The French Prophets were a millenarian sect who fled from France to England at the end of the seventeenth century. Mahomet, in strange company here, was, of course, the founder of the Islamic faith. Thomas Munzer preached an apocalyptic message to the lower classes of Saxony in the 1520s, stirring up a peasant revolt. George Fox and James Nayler were mid-seventeenth century Quaker leaders, who frequently denounced members of other Protestant sects as “antichristian”; Lodowick Muggleton claimed in 1651 to be one of the witnesses foretold in the Book of Revelation, and he denounced reason as the product of the Antichrist. Christopher Hill, The World Turned Upside Down (London: Penguin, 1972), 228, and Antichrist in Seventeenth-Century England, (London: Verso, 1971), 125–26, 132–33, 143; Stephen


32. Ibid., 24.


36. See references to Haller, Ray, and Colley in note 34 above.


41. See *The South-Carolina Gazette*, March 8 and March 15, 1740, for an illustration of how news about the war displaced articles about religious controversy.


43. Peter Wood employed social history methodology in *Black Majority*, now the classic interpretation of eighteenth-century South Carolina. Philip Morgan’s more recent *Slave Counterpoint* (University of North Carolina, 1998) does attempt to explore the mental world of white and black South Carolinians using the methods of cultural history. He has so entirely accepted the racial framework of the social historians, however, that he does not explore the possibility of any other factor being of fundamental importance in shaping the mentality of South Carolina’s whites. His work is a cultural history of race relations rather than an attempt to reconstruct culture and mentalité in their entirety.
“Christ is Out, Communism is On”
Opposition to the Congress of Industrial Organizations’s “Operation Dixie” in South Carolina, 1946–1951
Jonathan Gentry

Opposition to the attempts of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) to organize southern textile workers in the post-war period was multi-faceted. Two forms—anti-communism and religious conservatism—manifested themselves in the South during the post-World War II period, particularly from 1946 to 1951 when the CIO conducted a major organizing drive nicknamed Operation Dixie by journalists. Anti-communism and religious conservatism underlay the opposition of local newspaper editors, community leaders, and politicians to labor’s attempts to organize in the South. The issue of communist involvement in the CIO had long been used as a weapon against its northern and western unions, but it would prove less successful against the more politically conservative southern unions and their openly anti-communist leadership. During Operation Dixie in South Carolina, the CIO faced heated attacks from citizens’ committees, the Ku Klux Klan (KKK), and Protestant clergy for its policy of organizing workers regardless of color and for the support it received from the Catholic church and its supposed infiltration by godless communists.

During and after World War II, northern mill owners had continued the pre-war trend of shifting more of their textile production to the pro-business environment of the South. Consequently, the number of textile workers had increased significantly, and by war’s end the number of industrial workers as a whole had risen from a pre-war level of 1.6 million to 2.4 million. A wartime labor shortage and a War Labor Board that enforced minimum wages and union security, however, had compelled mill owners to cease their assault on unionization. Thus by 1945, the CIO had been able to increase its southern membership to about one hundred seventy-five thousand and had become confident it could acquire more.

In March 1946, the executive board of the CIO developed a Southern Organizing Committee (SOC) and planned a southern labor drive. The time seemed ripe as layoffs and work reductions in several industries, particularly textiles, had resulted in less take-home pay. In addition, mill owners in South Carolina were planning to initiate a five-year modernizing program that would invest over $50 million in new machinery and result in even more cutbacks. In May 1946 the CIO launched Operation Dixie under the direction of its SOC. Organizers in the campaign sought to recruit 1.5 million unorganized, unskilled southern workers within
one year while maintaining their local unions. To date, Operation Dixie remains the largest and longest-sustained organizing drive in the South. With over a million dollars contributed by member unions and about two hundred fifty full-time organizers, the CIO sought to organize 2.4 million workers in twelve southern states in industries such as textile, tobacco, furniture, chemical, oil, and steel production. Money and manpower, much of it from the Textile Workers Union of America (TWUA), dictated that the SOC concentrate its resources on the half-million textile workers in the Piedmont region of the Carolinas.

To avoid being labeled radical, the CIO shunned controversial tactics. Consequently, it used mostly southern organizers in Operation Dixie, took an anti-communist stance, and forbade integrated union meetings. Indeed, veteran southern organizers, many of whom were white males with anti-communist and anti-integration leanings, constituted 75 percent or more of the CIO organizers. To avoid negative publicity, South Carolina mill owners adjusted their tactics as well. They refrained from hiring strike breakers, instead delivering their message through the radio, newspaper and their religious mouthpiece, the mill preacher, and they took advantage of post-war prosperity to forestall or break strikes simply by raising wages. Both sides sought to use the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to their advantage—unions by filing protests against a mill for unfair labor practices and owners by delaying union recognition elections. Overall, the mill owners had more success than the CIO in using the NLRB to their advantage.

In addition to anti-communism, rival unionism plagued the CIO’s attempts to organize in the South. To counter Operation Dixie, the American Federation of Labor (AFL) mobilized 3,300 organizers in an organizing campaign of its own. The Southern Director of the AFL, George Googe, kicked off the AFL campaign by unabashedly informing southerners of the new “communist” threat posed by the latest CIO organizing drive. AFL President William Green’s comments on Operation Dixie were typical: “Neither reactionary employers nor communists in the CIO can stop the campaign of the American Federation of Labor to enroll 1,000,000 unorganized southern workers in the next twelve months,” and he advised southern mill owners to “grow and cooperate with us or fight for your life against communist forces.” The AFL’s “organization drive” appears simply to have been an attempt to hinder support for Operation Dixie.

Religious conservatives and the Southern Industrial Council also attacked Operation Dixie. The Council in its newspaper, Militant Truth, warned southerners that the CIO sought social and economic equality between blacks and whites. Conservative ministers frequently asserted that the CIO’s initials stood for “Christ is Out—
Communism is On.” Neither this opposition, however, nor the initial unresponsive-
ess of mill workers disheartened CIO organizers. They largely ignored it and con-
centrated on using supportive ministers to win over uncommitted workers.6

From the beginning, Operation Dixie faced problems far more serious than the AFL, KKK or religious conservatives. Embarrassingly, it had underestimated the
cost of funding Operation Dixie and had overestimated its ability to attract new
members. Rising inflation and the maintenance of striking workers were costing
$144,000 a month without a comparable influx of union dues. In the fall of 1946 at
an annual CIO convention in Atlantic City, the delegates received the bad news—
the organizing campaign had spent $800,000 of the appropriated $1 million, and
the SOC’s already pitiful staff and budget would have to be cut by about one half.
These constraints meant the SOC would have to pool its resources and concentrate
only on textiles, particularly those mills that looked most promising. In South Caro-
lina this meant the remaining eight organizers with only a $4,700 budget would have
to be employed in towns like Rock Hill where the TWUA had met with success.7

Though some headway was achieved in Rock Hill, Columbia, and Clifton, the
CIO’s attempts to organize in South Carolina made few gains. By October 1949 only
forty elections had been held involving some eleven thousand workers. Though the
TWUA won thirty-three of these, they netted only about seventy-six hundred new
members. The TWUA never succeeded in organizing more than 12 percent of South
Carolina’s textile workers and probably never had more than a total of sixteen thou-
sand members.8 For the reason it failed to organize the South Carolina textile indus-
try one must look to anti-union opposition.

Most of the opposition to Operation Dixie in South Carolina took place in the
heartland of the textile industry in the Piedmont and upstate. Predictably, the stron-
gest opposition took place in areas where the CIO showed the strongest presence, or
in areas with a tradition of union opposition like Rock Hill and Anderson. Ande-
son, with an anti-union tradition dating at least back to 1916, was considered by
organizers to be the stronghold of anti-unionist activity. Its citizens formed the Ande-
son Citizens Committee in February 1950 to combat CIO activity in the area. The
committee not only published weekly attacks against the TWUA but also kept the
CIO off Anderson’s air waves and defeated its attempts to organize in the town’s
textile plants.9 Most of the anti-union literature in the CIO’s SOC papers emanated
from Anderson. Dr. C. S. Breedin of Anderson, one of the town’s chief anti-union
spokesmen, wrote several letters filled with racist and religious bigotry to National
Director George Baldanzi. He thanked “. . . God we do have some ministers of the
Gospel who have guts enough to preach from their pulpits the curses of your hellish
organization.”¹⁰ He also wrote a bitter denunciation of the Catholic Church, which had issued two resolutions in January 1951 supporting the CIO’s labor organizing in the South. It is doubtful that Breedin spoke for 90 percent of Anderson’s citizens as he claimed to, but he probably spoke for the majority.¹¹

Other upstate towns also had their share of anti-unionists. Spartanburg, the headquarters of the CIO in South Carolina, contained a strong anti-unionist element. The Textile Tribune, a small paper published by R. L. DeYoung of Spartanburg, was known for smearing the CIO with the taint of communism. Although the CIO had thoroughly cleansed itself of the communist “menace” by 1950, DeYoung and other southern small-time textile newspapermen still attacked it for communist leanings. In an angry letter to DeYoung, Earl Smith, a business agent for the TWUA from Converse, referred to the fact that though the CIO specifically prohibited communists from holding office and had expelled eleven affiliated unions at the cost of some one million members, employers and newspapermen still exploited the communist issue. Many CIO officials like South Carolina Director Franz Daniel prided themselves on the CIO’s anti-communist shift from 1949 to 1950 and hoped they had rid themselves of the communist stigma.¹² Unfortunately, such sacrifices mattered little to their opponents who were attacking the CIO not for its communist membership but because it dared to organize in the South.

To better understand union opposition in South Carolina, its is important to examine how that opposition took shape in textile mills like the Aragon-Baldwin Mill in Rock Hill owned by J. P. Stevens. J.P. Stevens’s opposition to the CIO’s campaigns at its Aragon-Baldwin Mill proved both extensive and virulent. During the second attempt to organize the mill in 1946, company officials warned workers that if they voted for the union the company might close the mill and move it to another state or to Mexico. Though the workers did not need reminding, management made it clear that the company had the power to evict families from company-owned homes in the mill village. During a third organizing attempt at Aragon-Baldwin, mill foremen, to intimidate workers into refusing CIO literature, routinely stood at the mill gates beside organizers who were handing out leaflets. Some union workers who had been fired by the company were told they could have their jobs back with additional benefits if they destroyed their union cards. The Aragon-Baldwin management probably also pressured the local radio station—WRHI, which was broadcasting the CIO’s fifteen minute weekly spots—into censoring the CIO’s already inoffensive dialogue. Because of pressure by the radio station on CIO organizers to dilute their broadcasts, the CIO was forced to switch to another station. These tactics were effective in reducing union enrollment, but mill owners in the South had two primary weap-
ons—their ability to delay the NLRB’s holding of union recognition elections and their power to circumvent the union local’s strength by raising wages. The use of both during an organizing drive often crippled the CIO’s attempts to win elections by severely damaging union morale.\footnote{13}

Organizers repeatedly complained to Director Daniel about the time it took the NLRB to call for a union recognition election at Aragon-Baldwin and the damaging effect the delay had on morale. Mills throughout the South faced similar situations. Knowing that it had the TWUA in an awkward situation, J. P. Stevens was able to delay elections by either interjecting unreasonable demands on the union or filing complaints against it. J. P. Stevens also used the infamous Taft-Hartley law passed in June 1947 to its advantage. Among other things, the law gave employers (or their agents) greater freedom to speak out against the union prior to an election and defined “employer” in terms so broad that citizens’ committees were excluded from NLRB jurisdiction. The cumbersome law created a mountain of litigation, most of it brought by local unions, who were charging employers eager to explore the new confines of a much less restrictive labor law with unfair labor practices. According to Timothy Minchin, “by October 1947 the NLRB had the greatest backlog of cases in its eleven year history.” This backlog, combined with the fact that the NLRB was understaffed and underfunded, made the election process much longer than necessary. Minchin wrote that “by March 1948 it took almost twice as long for the board to conduct an election as it had in 1946.”\footnote{14}

Wage increases, too, made union elections and contracts difficult to win during the first two years of Operation Dixie. In July 1946 fifteen union locals representing more than fifteen thousand workers in the state demanded free health insurance and a twelve cent raise—an increase of the minimum wage from sixty-five to seventy-seven cents an hour. Mill owners in the Carolinas immediately responded by issuing an eight cent raise in most of their mills. One organizer in Rock Hill found unorganized workers especially unreceptive after these wage increases, and many workers questioned why they needed to pay union dues to receive what they were already getting anyway.\footnote{15}

Companies also used other tactics to mitigate union gains. After union workers at the Bleachery in Rock Hill fought to get free insurance in their union contract in the fall of 1946, several unorganized mills in the area announced free insurance programs. Mill owners also went to court to obtain injunctions against striking workers to limit their ability to picket. Violence, though rare, was used clandestinely by anti-union workers and perhaps by mill owners to intimidate strikers. The director of the CIO’s SOC, John V. Riffe, was brutally beaten and almost killed by some anti-
union thugs in Columbia in March 1949. In May 1951 daily violence broke out between strikers and anti-union workers at the Industrial Cotton Mill in Rock Hill. One non-union worker’s house was dynamited. The violence prevalent during this particular campaign combined with the mill’s success in blaming it on the union killed an attempt to organize the nearby Springs Mills plant in Fort Mill. Violence was not the norm, however, since mill owners could often stifle union morale simply by calling out the local police force to “protect” non-union workers.16

Though retired organizers have cited apathetic workers and stifling mill villages as reasons for the CIO’s failure to organize the South, religious opposition, often with racial and anti-communist overtones, provides a better explanation. Although several mainstream denominations sanctioned the organizing of labor, ministers in mill churches often spoke out against the CIO as an “evil” organization run by atheistic communists. They accused it of forcing whites to work alongside blacks and of driving businesses out of the state by raising wages above the amount employers wanted to pay. Ministers warned workers that the union would starve their families by charging dues and keeping them out on strike. In South Carolina, particularly in the upstate, religious leaders took the initiative in attacking the CIO.17 In September 1946 Lucy Randolph Mason, chief public relations official for the SOC and Operation Dixie, reported to State Director Daniel about strong religious opposition in the upstate, citing particularly the towns of Liberty and Easley near Anderson. In Easley, Mason found a Baptist minister who forced union members in the church to choose between it and the CIO. At a nearby Baptist church, a young pro-union Sunday School superintendent was asked to leave. In the middle of a CIO organizing drive at the Pacific Mills in Lyman in March 1949, a Baptist minister told his church members that “it’s either Christ or the CIO. You can be a Christian or a CIO man, but you can’t be both.” Mason wrote to a pro-union Baptist minister and friend lamenting the fact that “so many Baptist preachers are against the union” and that their forcing parishioners to choose between God and the CIO was having “a disastrous effect on organization.”18

Most studies of Operation Dixie cast it as unmitigated failure and, in a haze of introspection and criticism, postulate alternate outcomes. It would have been more successful, they say, if only the CIO had been more inclusive towards blacks, more internally united, more committed to industry-wide organizing, or more militant. Lacking is an accurate picture of the labor environment of the period, and, more importantly, of southern opposition to the CIO. The southern worker, labor organizer, union, and mill culture are not primarily responsible for the defeat of the CIO in the South. Anti-communist and conservative religious elements in the South coa-
lessed successfully to combat the “evil menace” of the CIO. Mill preachers and conservative community leaders fought strenuously against the “vice” of unionism and for the “virtue” of union-free mills. Communism and racism served as excellent weapons for these men in their quest to combat union organizing. When wage increases failed to entice “rebellious” workers back into the fold, these men would raise the specter of communism or integration effectively to combat the CIO’s attempts to build strong union locals. Because they understood the tactics of southern anti-unionists, most southern CIO organizers decided to focus on winning elections and staying away from controversial issues such as race and communism. Though they chose the less radical, less militant course, it was the only course available to them given the historical and social realities of the time. Segregation, anti-communism and a history of union failures in the South existed for decades prior to Operation Dixie. A labor campaign, particularly one as weak as Operation Dixie, would not stand a chance if it tried to organize southern workers while challenging their political and social beliefs. Perhaps southern workers remain unorganized today because the forces that defeated Operation Dixie continue to convince them they have everything to lose and nothing to gain from joining a union.

ENDNOTES
1. Some examples of northern and western unions often attacked for their communist membership were the United of Electrical Radio and Machine Workers, the International Longshoremen’s and Warehousemen’s Union, and the International Union of Mine, Mill, and Smelter Workers. One notable exception to the majority of conservative southern unions was the Food, Tobacco, and Allied Workers Union in Winston Salem, North Carolina. This union was known for its communist leanings and openly integrated union meetings. Several journal articles and monographs have paid tribute to this union as one of the vanguard unions that instituted racial equality and integration long before it was achieved in the civil rights era.


3. “S.C. Mills Plan Modernization,” 17 September 1946, Rock Hill Evening Herald; Katherine F. Martin, ed., Operation Dixie, The CIO Organizing Committee Papers, 1946 - 1953: A Guide to the Microfilm Edition (New York: Microfilming Corporation of America, 1980), 1; Griffith, 25–26, 28. Zieger noted that the CIO’s 1938 membership was only 1.3 million. The importance of the TWUA cannot be overstated since it provided a majority of the organizers and $125,000 of the $1 million in appropriated funds. The possibility of covering twelve states with only 250 organizers appears idealistic to say the least. The organizing effort at the Cannon Mills in Kannapolis, NC, alone involved ten organizers. Griffith reported that the CIO’s emphasis on textiles caused some
organizers with no experience to be assigned to the textile industry. Joseph Stuart Devlin, Jr., “Unionization in South Carolina Textiles, 1946–1956” (master’s thesis, University of South Carolina, 1962), 29. Devlin said the CIO’s goal was 1,500,000 and that they had 200 organizers. It’s probable that the CIO leadership stated different figures to different newspapers. Honey, 441. Again, Zieger’s numbers are lower, see Zieger, 228. Historian Timothy Minchin wrote that one of the reasons the CIO and TWUA concentrated primarily on white textile workers was because blacks made up only between 2 and 6 percent of the textile workforce in the areas of the industry’s greatest concentration (i.e. the Carolinas), see Timothy J. Minchin, What Do We Need a Union For?: The TWUA in the South, 1945–1955 (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 1997), 77. Minchin’s monograph is perhaps the best piece of scholarly writing on the CIO and TWUA. Minchin analyzed the arguments of Griffith and Zieger, among other historians, and developed an argument that is both rational and relatively unbiased. He questioned the apparent “failure” of Operation Dixie and stressed wage increases as the primary goal of the CIO in Operation Dixie and the primary weapon used against them by mill owners to combat their organization of southern mills.

4. Martin, 1. Griffith, 22. Honey, 448. Deputy Director of the Southern Organizing Committee George Baldanzi ordered all state directors to resign from the CIO’s Political Action Committees in their respective states. Honey noted that SOC Director Van Bittner was a vocal anti-communist who excluded leftists from Operation Dixie along with those organizers who favored integration.

5. Qtd. in Griffith, 24 and in Devlin, 32.

6. Zieger, 235. Paul R. Christopher to Burgess, 21 March 1950, Lucy Randolph Mason Papers, Correspondence, 5 January 1950–20 March 1954, Operation Dixie the CIO Organizing Committee Papers, 1946–1953 (Sanford, NC: Microfilming Corporation of America, 1980), Series 5, Reel 64, Part 1; The “Christ is Out—Communism is On” meaning in the CIO’s acronym originated with Rev. J. Harold Smith who preached against the union in High Point, NC, and Knoxville, TN, during the late 1930s and 1940s. Randall L. Patton, “The CIO and the Search for a ‘Silent South,’” The Maryland Historian 19 no. 2 (Fall/Winter 1988): 1, 4. The notable exception to CIO unions in the South is the North Carolina based Food, Tobacco, and Allied Workers Union. Its Local 22 in Winston Salem has received much discussion in recent labor histories thanks to Robert Korstad and others. Most of the CIO’s unions, unlike the FTA, did not have communist members and were not fully integrated. Auslander to Breeden, 15 June 1951, Charles Auslander correspondence, 11 November, 1950–14 June 1952, Organizing Committee Papers, Series 2, Reel 16, Part 10. See also Minchin, 40. Minchin also cited the above letter.


9. Labor History of Anderson County, South Carolina, Contracts and wage scales, 5 June 1948–6 December 1951, Organizing Committee Papers, Series 2, Reel 17, Part 40. Minchin, 35.


12. Earl Smith to R. L. DeYoung, 2 June 1950, Attacks correspondence, 12 August 1946–2 June 1950, Organizing Committee Papers, Series 2, Reel 23, Part 168. Zieger, 277. Zieger’s discussion of the anti-communist purge conducted by the CIO against affiliated members is quite thorough. Daniel to Governor Strom Thurmond, 7 November 1949, Strom Thurmond correspondence, 29 January 1947–8 November 1949, Organizing Committee Papers, Series 2, Reel 23, Part 178. Daniel’s letter to Thurmond is a very interesting look at how the CIO leadership viewed not only the communist element in the CIO but also its affiliated left wing unions. The reader gets the sense that a significant portion of the leadership viewed left wing unions as “dead weight” for some time prior to 1949 and were eager to get rid of them.

13. Burgess, 74–75. Daniel to Bittner, 16 January 1948, Weekly Reports to Van Bittner, 19 December–24 January 1948, Organizing Committee Papers, Series 2, Reel 16, Part 15. Burgess to Isadore Katz, 17 June 1948. Franz Daniel personal correspondence, 5 June 1946–5 October 1950, Organizing Committee Papers, Series 2, Reel 18, Part 45. The Rock Hill organizers switched to WTYC owned by Tri-County Broadcasting Corporation in October 1949. Standard Contract for Spot Broadcasting—Radio Station WTYC, 24 October 1949, General File correspondence, 24 August 1941–6 April 1953, Organizing Committee Papers, Series 2, Reel 19, Part 71. Union recognition elections were held after the union petitioned the NLRB and convinced it to call for an election, which was conducted by the NLRB using a secret ballot. Winning the election meant the union had the right to represent the workers of the mill in any contract negotiations. Any concessions gained affected all workers. A security or decertification election was held periodically (after successful petition by the company) when union membership fell below the majority of workers employed at the mill or whenever the company felt it could win one. Sometime the company was able to delay an election long enough to weaken a formerly strong union and finish it off in the election. The delay allowed the company time to get its propaganda campaign up and working.

14. Burgess to Daniel, 1 September 1948; Burgess to Daniel, 16 September 1948, Fraz Daniel personal correspondence, 5 June 1946–5 October 1950, Organizing Committee Papers, Series 2, Reel 18, Part 45. Burgess hoped to convince Senator Olin D. Johnston of South Carolina to use his influence to pressure the NLRB into speeding up the election date. Devlin, 76–77; Minchin, 33–34. Taft-Hartley also forbade CIO Political Action Committees (PAC) from donating money to federal elections. See also Memoranda Re: Taft-Hartley Bill, 7 July 1947, Taft-Hartley Bill analysis,

16. Minchin, 50, 161, 165; “Mills Providing Free Insurance,” Rock Hill Evening Herald, 20 May 1947; “Bleachery Gets Injunction to Control Pickets,” Rock Hill Evening Herald, 7 April 1951; “Violence Occurs at Mill As Shots Fired at Strikers,” Rock Hill Evening Herald, 18 July 1951; “Blasts Damage Mill Employees’ Belongings,” Rock Hill Evening Herald, 7 August 1951; “Restraining Order Issued Against TWUA,” Rock Hill Evening Herald, 23 July 1951; “Union Meeting Today May Bring End to Long Industrial Mill Strike,” Rock Hill Evening Herald, 17 August 1951; Mason, 102–3; Burgess, 78. Circuit Judge Joseph Moss issued an injunction limiting the number of picketers at Rock Hill Printing and Finishing and Industrial Mill to four per gate. With only eight strikers at the gates at each mill, the union could not make much of a presence at either. Burgess wrote that the union members arrested for the dynamite incident were released after serving six months in jail when their lawyer convinced the court they had been framed.

17. Burgess, “The Role of the Churches in Relation to the CIO Southern Organizing Drive,” nd, David Burgess correspondence, 16 October 1948–4 June 1950, Organizing Committee Papers, Series 2, Reel 16, Part 18; Mason to Burgess, 6 April 1950, Lucy Randolph Mason correspondence, 5 January 1950–20 March 1954, Organizing Committee Papers, Series 5, Reel 64, Part 1. There are some useful but incomplete statistics included in Burgess’s report.

Looking back fifty years in 1975, Hugh Morgan Sr. reflected nostalgically about the Laurens Glass Works where he had worked since 1925. Having observed a steady expansion of the plant over those years the retired employee reflected that, “Some of us old timers will miss a part of the new things that are on the way.” Indeed the Laurens plant had seen amazing growth since its founding in 1910. From renovated furniture factory building with an estimated workforce of fifty to seventy-five, it had grown into a major manufacturer of glass bottles and containers with employment at more than eight hundred by the early 1970s. Yet the rosy future that Morgan predicted proved illusory. By 1996 after mergers with several larger glass manufacturers over two decades, Laurens Glass would close its doors for good. This paper is an initial study—an overview of the founding of Laurens Glass, its labor-management relations, and its successful growth and expansion over the decades. For more than eighty years its well crafted soft drink bottles, its stable work force, and its many clients throughout the Southeast and beyond made it one of the premier manufacturers in the region. Unfortunately, in the 1970s, the success it had achieved was slowly but steadily being displaced by the advent of plastic containers.

Ironically, Laurens Glass almost failed before it really began. The company’s early history is sketchy, however, since few documents about its origins remain. It started with great fanfare as the state’s second glass bottle producer. Columbia had the distinction of having the Palmetto State’s first—Carolina Glass Company—which had opened in 1902 initially to produce bottles for the controversial South Carolina Dispensary. When this state monopoly was eliminated in 1907 the Columbia firm focused on soda, mineral water and medicine bottles. But for unknown reasons it closed in 1913. The Laurens project was the brainchild of a few prominent business and political leaders in the Laurens community led by Nathaniel Dial. A lawyer and businessman who seemed to epitomize the New South ideal of economic progress, Dial already had established a textile mill in Ware Shoals, a bank in Laurens, several power plants, and other entrepreneurial ventures in the upstate. Along with five other Laurens business leaders Dial formed a partnership with a capital investment of $50,000 to “manufacture bottles, glass, glassware . . .” and other articles usually made by a glass factory. The new enterprise also planned to mine and quarry stone,
rocks, and the “products and by-products thereof.” Speculation remains regarding why these men chose to establish their plant in this particular upstate town, but there may have been at least two reasons. The essential ingredients for glass production are sand (silica), soda ash, lime, and feldspar. One of these, sand, naturally occurs in Laurens County. Marion and Lexington counties, in eastern and central South Carolina respectively, have high quality natural glass sand deposits. It is also possible that they saw a chance to emulate Carolina Glass Company, which was still operating. When the first shift began in January 1911, local interest was high. A departure from the textile enterprises that had proliferated throughout the upstate by this time, Laurens Glass Works must have seemed an unusual attraction. Some of the earliest bottles produced went to the local Sanders Bottling Works, but the enterprise lacked sufficient expertise. By late 1911 the firm halted production because of persistent problems with the quality of its glass.

Laurens simply seemed to lack workers with sufficient skills and knowledge to produce bottles that were of consistent quality. During this era glass making was as much an art as a science. Without skilled personnel to measure the raw materials accurately, the glass produced often shattered or cracked in the mold. And when the glass bottle came out of the mold—at several hundred degrees or more—it had to be slowly cooled in an annealing machine or luhr. No matter how well the raw ingredients were measured in the furnace, glass that cooled too quickly would crack or shatter as well. It is unclear what the specific problems were during the first months of production at Laurens Glass, but it appeared that one or both of these problems existed. Consequently, while the plant remained out of production for a year, the investors recruited people who had the knowledge and experience to make a quality product. This meant that the southern owners looked north to production centers in Indiana, Ohio, Western Pennsylvania, and New Jersey where glass manufacturing had become a mature industry since at least the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Production resumed at Laurens Glass in early 1913 with better results. During the following two decades most of its clients came from the upstate and from other communities within South Carolina and contiguous states. Bottles were produced for mineral water producers such as Chick Springs in Greenville County and Harris Springs in southern Laurens County. Medicine bottles were also made for local druggists such as Orangeburg’s Wannamaker Manufacturer.

One of its first major soda drink bottle contracts was with Coca-Cola. Until 1899 Coke had been a fountain drink, but as the new century began a Chattanooga firm received permission to bottle the drink for distribution to a wider clientele. As a result, by 1915 Laurens became one of three southern firms to produce Coke
bottles. Contracts for Coke would be one of the firm’s mainstays during its first decade of production. The business relationship with Coke would continue for the next seven decades. The upstate plant made several types of Coke bottles, ranging from the classic six-ounce hobble skirt shape patented in 1915 to the twelve-ounce and commemoratives made later in the century.8

Laurens Glass Works steadily grew over the next several years despite occasional setbacks caused by economic downturns or war. Before World War I the plant saw production cut back and work shifts reduced to one a day for periods of several weeks. During the post-war depression of the early twenties, the Laurens firm had to shut down production for several months but resumed work in early 1922.9 In spite of slowdowns the reputation of its product did not appear to suffer. Contracts with Coke bottlers throughout the region continued to grow, while new clients in the Southeast, both big and small, sought the Laurens product. Laurens Glass bottles from the Holcombe collection show that southeastern bottlers of Frosty Root Beer, Dr Pepper (Waco, Texas), Pepsi (Eastern North Carolina), CheroCola (Columbus, Georgia), among many others, had contracts with the upcountry bottle manufacturer during the twenties and thirties. Smaller bottlers such as Game Cock Ginger Ale (Greenville) and the firm of Strawhorn and Seago (Greenwood) also ordered from Laurens Glass.10

To turn out bottles of enough quantity and quality required production and organization skills that Laurens Glass had acquired after its initial difficulties. Although some accounts claim that its glass blowers and their assistants made bottles by hand in the first decade of production, these claims are only partially accurate at best. Extant Laurens bottles show that until 1920 the body of the container was produced in a machine mold. Then the top portion where the lip and neck came together had to be tooled by hand. It is uncertain how many bottles could be made with this method. In 1911 it was estimated that in the first months of production the fledgling firm would soon produce “a cartload of bottles . . . daily.” It is unclear how much this amount would have been. As late as 1922, after work had just resumed following several months of inactivity, bottle production was estimated at two hundred to two hundred fifty per day.11 By 1925, when bottle production was completely mechanized, Laurens had at least one tank to mix and create the molten glass while two Lynch L.A. machines produced fourteen to sixteen bottles per minute. Production had increased so substantially by the following year that Laurens Glass claimed to produce twenty-five million soft drink bottles annually. While this may be an exaggeration, it is certain that the firm’s production rate accelerated significantly during the twenties. It is likely that several million bottles were produced annually by the
middle of the decade. Even as bottle production increased at significant rates after 1925 some procedures were still based on manpower. Hugh Morgan recalled that at this time Laurens Glass still used human power to pull the finished but still hot bottles through the long lehr machine to cool the containers gradually. Sometime later a machine-powered belt replaced the hand-pulled chains in the lehr. The plant continued to enhance its mechanization through the following decades while increasing its production volume by several magnitudes. Yet until the 1950s Laurens continued to mix the sand and the other ingredients by hand, measured in pounds per wheelbarrow load.

Despite the Great Depression of the 1930s Laurens continued to thrive and even expand its operation. More tanks and new machines were added periodically to replace or upgrade old ones. By 1932 the Glass Works had three tanks and eight automatic machines. Later in the decade Laurens Glass made a large, new investment in more equipment at a cost of $400,000, which probably included machinery for the new bottle labeling process, Applied Colored Labels. This process enabled the firm to produce a label that was more durable and colorful than the label produced by the traditional paper label application and embossing process, which had been used up to that time. With this new ability the firm’s growth was assured, especially after 1945. In 1946 over $600,000 was invested to expand and add new equipment, including a new building with an additional furnace and more bottle making machinery. By the late 1950s Laurens Glass could not keep up with demand despite five furnaces and eight bottle-making machines. Thus in 1959 a second bottle plant opened in Henderson (North Carolina) followed by a third in Ruston (Louisiana) early the following decade. The firm’s zenith appeared to have been reached in the late sixties when the national glass producing firm, Indian Head Glass, bought it out.

While leadership and investment money were crucial to the success of the Glass Works, an experienced, skilled work force was just as important. In the wake of the glass quality problems in 1911 management hired many glass workers out of the glassmaking regions of the Midwest and Northeast. Fortunately, the Laurens Glass owners had the money and time to recruit the experienced labor they needed. Glassblowers, assistants, and other specialized workers from Illinois, Ohio, Pennsylvania and New Jersey were recruited while the plant remained inactive for about a year. William Bryant, the operating manager, came from Ohio and brought several more glass blowers and assistants with him. John Finkbeiner, a native of Germany, brought his wife and four sons from Clarion County in West Pennsylvania, another center of glass production. By 1920 Finkbeiner was superintendent of the Glass Works and had two sons, Albert and Rudolph, employed as glass blowers. His second eldest son,
Robert, brought his own young family with him to work in Laurens as a glassblower. George Creamer from Streator (Illinois) brought his glass knowledge to Laurens as well. Frank Barber from New Jersey served as a glass blower in Laurens and brought his wife with him from the Garden State.\textsuperscript{16}

Just as important to the operation were the mold makers. Although Laurens purchased molds from factories in Toledo (Ohio) and other midwestern factories, these skilled mold makers had to make and revise the mold designs to suit each order and to repair them when necessary. One of the first in the groups of mold makers who came to Laurens was the Zupp family. Adam Zupp came from New York, where he probably learned the mold trade from his German-born father. He was probably recruited to join the fledgling upstate firm in 1913. It was in the Laurens Glass Works that he later taught his son, George, the trade. By the middle of the century the younger Zupp would teach the trade to the next generation of mold makers.\textsuperscript{17}

The census data of 1920 seem to indicate that most, if not all, of the skilled work force came from the Midwest and East, while the laborers who unloaded the ingredients for glass making, loaded the finished bottles, and did other less skilled jobs were locals, and often African American. Thus while people like Finkbeiner and Zupp operated the skilled parts of the operation, African Americans like Martin Meadors, Chester Henry, and Ella Duckett from South Carolina made up much of the less skilled labor force. Nevertheless some whites like J. M. Rogers were in these positions as well. Although sixty-four years old, Rogers worked in the packing crew of the Glass Works preparing finished bottles for shipment.\textsuperscript{18}

Despite the racial divide between skilled and less skilled labor, wages appeared higher than for comparable jobs in the upstate’s major industry, textiles. In 1913 wages were “nearly equivalent” to those of each of the local textile mills. Although this is speculative, it is reasonable to assume that management had to compete with the textile industry to attract and keep the skilled workers necessary for a viable operation. This situation also seemed to apply to less skilled jobs. By the 1940s wages appeared better than for most textile occupations of equivalent status. Less skilled positions in the warehouse and loading section were able to attract Bill Mills, an African American, who began working there in 1939. Because everything was loaded into boxcars by hand, the hours were long and difficult. Yet Mills left only because of World War II. In 1946 he returned to the plant to resume his old job and remained there for the rest of his career, retiring in the late 1970s.\textsuperscript{19}

Some families had two or three generations who worked at Laurens Glass. The Finkbeiners worked in both skilled and managerial positions up through the 1970s, as did the Zupp family. Many other employees without a generational connection
still remained there throughout their careers. Warehouse Manager Furman Parris started as a laborer at the plant in 1962 and stayed more than four decades, earning promotions until he became shipping manager. Ten years earlier Hugh Edwards had begun his career in the decorating department where ACL labels were baked on bottles. When Laurens stopped the production of soda drink bottles in the mid-eighties he had to change duties but remained at the plant until his retirement in the 1990s. Those workers interviewed agreed that throughout the last half-century of the firm’s life, pay and working conditions were the best in the area.20

Women were also part of the work force. Until the late 1930s or 1940s they worked only in the office in what appear to have been secretarial positions. When the ACL process was introduced prior to World War II, women began to work in the decorating department. By 1946 they were integral to this process at Laurens Glass. Some women loaded bottles into boxes after the labels were applied. Others loaded unlabeled bottles into the ACL machines to have the markings applied. Some families had both spouses employed at the plant for several years. By the last year of Laurens Glass’ operation, Melody Motes had put in twenty years at the plant. Her husband had worked there for thirty-four years. A brother-in-law had put in twenty-one, and her son, aged twenty-five, had worked several years for the company.21

This seemingly ideal workplace for men and women nevertheless had a union organization at least as early as 1919. Officers for local Branch 35 of the National Glass Bottle Blowers Association included Dan Dowdy, president, and L. W. Higbe, vice president. By the 1940s there were two locals in the plant, which apparently represented the white and black workforce. In 1970 these branches were integrated in conformance with the era’s integration in other sectors of southern society. How much impact the union had on labor-management relations during the plant’s early decades is unknown. Nevertheless, by the middle of the century it had a significant role. The first documented strike in late 1951 lasted six weeks. Details are sketchy, but one cause appeared to be the Union’s demand to represent all workers in labor contracts. Another issue concerned modernization. Bill Mills recalled that management tried to dismiss those on the work force who were deemed too inefficient to aid in the modernization of production at that time. The final agreement that ended the strike in early December was not disclosed. It appeared that management prevented the union from winning its demand for sole right to represent the work force in future negotiations. Workers, however, estimate that during the last two decades of the firm’s operation more than 80 percent of employees were paid union members. Whether the strike forced management to stop dismissing workers as the plant modernized is unknown.22
Other job actions occurred in the sixties and seventies. In 1968 a seven-week strike ended in March after management agreed to pay increases for all employees. In the 1970s the Laurens firm stayed closed for five weeks when a national strike was called by the union over dual job responsibilities during the same shift. Management did not want employees to spend their entire eight-hour shift monitoring automatic machines that required little maintenance. They argued that this was too costly and that workers should do other jobs while they monitored the machines. The compromise eventually reached allowed workers a two-hour monitoring limit so supervisors could assign them to other duties during their eight-hour shift. One mold shop worker recalling this strike remembered that most of the work force opposed the job action, but since it was mandated by the national union, the local chapter had to comply.23

In any event, friction between management and labor was minimal most of the time. Various indicators suggest that relations were usually harmonious. After Nathaniel Dial and his original investors helped the Laurens firm get started, Dial’s nephew, Albert Dial, assumed leadership of the firm. The younger Dial was the inspiration behind Laurens Glass. He led the reorganization and hiring of skilled workers from the Midwest and East and oversaw the firm’s establishment in the glass bottle business before his premature death in 1928.24

Ernest Easterby succeeded the younger Dial, and he, too, became a force behind the glass plant’s survival and early growth. Also a Laurens native, Easterby had progressed through the ranks and worked alongside Albert Dial. Once he assumed the leadership of the firm he remained its president for over forty years. He earned the respect of most employees at Laurens Glass. Those who worked under his regime until his death in 1974 remember his even-handed demeanor and encouraging comments on and off the production floor. Born in 1888, he had worked at the upstate firm from its early days and was an important collaborator with Albert Dial in resurrecting the fledgling firm after its initial failure in 1911. He relinquished his post as president in 1971 but stayed as chairman of the board until his death. The success of Laurens Glass under his long tenure indicated his sound managerial skills, which kept most confrontations between management and labor to a minimum.25

Some of Easterby’s style had a practical purpose. Work inside a glass plant was dirty, dangerous, and hot, with molten glass sometimes at temperatures of nearly 3,000 degrees Fahrenheit. Flexibility in management was a necessity to maintain good morale. And with skilled workers it was important to keep them satisfied. One by-product of this flexible attitude can be seen in the whimsies or after-hour glass created on the production line. These idiosyncratic glass ornaments were fashioned during second and third shifts when management supervision was minimal or when
there was a break in production. It is uncertain when the practice began, but workers were producing such items in the early 1960s. Glass ashtrays, canes, various odd shaped design pieces, and long-necked objects formed while glass was still pliable were created by workers when they could do so and when they thought supervisors were not around. These items were taken home or given away to fellow workers. Robert Young, who worked in the mold shop for over thirty years, recalled that he sometimes made pieces of cast iron into a mold to make ashtrays and other glass trinkets. Sometimes his imagination went beyond simple designs and led to unexpected benefits for his employers. In the 1970s when the C. F. Sauer Company of Richmond, Virginia, was preparing to celebrate its centennial year of producing mayonnaise and other condiments, Young decided he would do a small batch of jars to commemorate this anniversary. He created designed molds with “Happy 100th Anniversary C. F Sauer” embossed on the side. Six dozen were produced and sent to the regional manager in Greenville, South Carolina. When Sauer managers saw them they were so impressed that nearly fifteen hundred more were ordered. Although such independent action probably was unusual, whimsies continued to be made until the plant closed. And while some employees claimed that the firm’s management knew of the practice, it rarely interfered and, if it did, the resulting reprimand was mild and without repercussions.26

Although whimsies represented the longest enduring piece of spontaneous creativity at Laurens, workers’ talent earned some special contracts. During the decade of the sixties the upstate Glass Works was hired to make Coke bottles for an Israeli customer who ordered Hebrew script on one side of the bottle. Only a few remain today, and several of those working at the plant recall this order. About seven cases were made and they were delivered to Charleston, presumably for shipment to the Middle East.27

Perhaps the most prestigious order received by Laurens Glass Works was in 1963 and associated with one of the nation’s greatest tragedies. As Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson prepared to welcome President John F. Kennedy for a Texas visit in November, he planned a reception for the nation’s chief executive at his Texas ranch. Being a man who both respected and sought status, Johnson wanted soda club bottles made with the vice presidential seal inscribed on each bottle. Laurens Glass received an order for 2,400 Canada Dry Club Soda bottles with the stipulated seal. They were shipped to a Waco, Texas bottler for filling. But Kennedy was assassinated before Johnson’s reception could occur. In the aftermath of this tragic event, the new President ordered all the bottles scrapped. Even though most probably were destroyed, a few survived and are highly desired by bottle collectors today.28
While these special contracts marked Laurens Glass Works as one of the nation’s top bottle manufacturers, the importance of glass bottles in American stores and households started to decline as plastic bottles and other containers began to replace them in the mid to late seventies. As this trend accelerated and larger and larger conglomerates absorbed more bottling business, the upstate firm’s place in the market declined.

Speculation surrounds the reasons for the 1968 sale of the family-run Laurens Glass to Indian Head, a larger, national firm in Wilmington (Delaware). Publicly Easterby claimed the merger gave Laurens better business opportunities. At the time he still claimed that Laurens Glass management would remain in effective control and the daily operations would remain the same. Reflecting on the merger years later, employees have offered other reasons. One suggested that the family-operated firm was losing its allure for the next generation of owners, its main shareholders. The merger was an ideal opportunity to get out of the business and make a good return on investments. Another explanation appears even more plausible. Having observed changes in the container business over time, Easterby realized that in another decade or so plastics would displace glass. He decided to sell to make the best return for the original investors before the glass market fell. Whatever the reasons, for the next decade production and sales remained good and thrived after Indian Head moved its headquarters from Wilmington to Laurens in 1974. But later Indian Head itself was absorbed. By 1990 Laurens had become a subsidiary of the container conglomerate, Ball-InCon, based in Indiana. In 1986, with plastic bottles now dominating the market, Laurens ceased glass soda bottle production and focused on glass jars and containers for foods and medicines.

Ten years later Laurens Glass announced its closing. With glass beverage bottles virtually displaced by plastics, the attempt to find another niche in the glass container business seemed out of place for a firm that had made its name with soda bottles for so long. But the company’s final demise stemmed from more practical business issues, namely old equipment, the plant’s inability to expand and accommodate updated machinery, and transportation costs. Since the upstate firm was much further from major markets in the Northeast than was its Henderson plant, management decided it was more economical to keep the Henderson plant operating. Freight charges from Henderson to places such as Washington, D.C., and New York City were significantly cheaper. By the time Laurens closed, its work force had already shrunk to half the size of its early-seventies maximum of over eight hundred. Today the complex still stands. All its furnaces and bottle machines are gone, however, and huge empty spaces now occupy the once busy factory floors. Although
Laurens Glass has been closed for less than a decade, few know its history or seem to remember its importance to the economy of the upstate. Much more needs to be done to unearth its rich heritage. Future study will hopefully shed more insight on the early history of Laurens Glass and its founders, the evolving relationship between management and labor, and production changes that turned the smaller upstate town into one of the Southeast’s major glass bottle manufacturers. This overview is only a beginning to what is one of South Carolina’s most unique industrial stories.31

Acknowledgements

The author wishes to thank the Holcombe family of Clinton, South Carolina, for planting the seed for this paper and aiding in the creation of the exhibition on Laurens Glass that opened at the South Carolina State Museum 6 April 2002. They have provided access to their large collection of Laurens Glass bottle and other artifacts as well as to extensive research they have done on the firm over the last three decades. Dr. Fred Holcombe, now deceased, began this work, and he and his son, Joe Holcombe, have been invaluable in putting this paper and the exhibition together. The author also thanks his colleagues at the State Museum and interns Lauren Roy of Columbia College, for reading through earlier drafts of this study, and Heather Carpini of USC-Columbia, for the time she spent sorting through dozens of bottles and identifying them by age and type.

Note on Laurens Glass bottles

The bulk of the bottles reviewed for this study was collected over more than two decades by the Holcombe family in Clinton, South Carolina, some eighty of which were borrowed for display in the SCSM exhibition, “Homeblown: Beverage Bottle of Laurens Glass Works, 1910–1996.” The SCSM has a small bottle collection, which includes Laurens Glass Works (LGW) examples, but these date to 1939 and after. Today many bottles of the post-1940 production era can be found in flea markets and antique shops. Examples prior to 1939 are more difficult to find, especially those from the plant’s first decade of production. This is, in large part, because Laurens Glass did not identify its bottles until 1919. Starting at this time until the early 1960s it affixed an embossed “LGW” on the base or corner-base of each bottle produced. In the sixties the bottle identification changed to distinguish Laurens-produced bottles from those of its branch plants in Henderson, North Carolina, and Ruston, Louisiana. These new marks were “L” for Laurens-produced bottles, “L.*” for those made in Henderson, and “L.*(2)” for those that came from the Ruston plant.
1. “Employee Describes Changes in Glass Making,” Totem Tales, (Employee Publication of Lauren’s Glass Co., Vol. 2, #1), May 1975, copy provided by Holcombe family, Clinton, SC.


4. B. F. Buie, “Industrial Minerals and Rocks,” in South Carolina Raw Materials, (Columbia, SC, University of South Carolina Press, 1949) 117–18. According to Buie, Laurens Glass was using sand from Marion in the 1940s. In the following decade and later, according to retired employees who began working at LGW in the 1950s and 60s, all the raw materials for the plant came from other states, see Furman Parris interview with the author, Joe Holcombe and Paul Jeter, 11 October 2001, Clinton, SC, transcript on file, S.C. State Museum (SCSM). According to one Laurens County history, based on oral traditions, a Luther A. McCord, local photographer, took up prospecting in the county and “studied the pebbles, the sand, the rocks and quartz that he believed would make glass.” With this knowledge he took the idea to some “progressive-minded business men” in Laurens who agreed and organized the Glass Works, see Louise McCord, The Scrapbook: A Compilation of Historical Facts . . . of Laurens County South Carolina (Laurens, Laurens County Historical Society and Laurens County Arts Council, 1982), 272–73.

5. Laurens Advertiser, 20 September 1911; I wish to thank Tom Savage of Columbia for his research in locating this information. The early problems that forced the initial venture at LGW to shut down are sketchy, but the plant was closed for a period and began production again in early 1913, see Laurens Advertiser, 8 January 1913.


7. Recruitment of bottle blowers and assistants from northern states is based on “Employee Describes Changes in Glass Making,” and on Laurens County Census, South Carolina, 1920, SCDAH; for restarting production see Laurens Advertiser, 8 January 1913. Information on early clients for Laurens are based on extant bottles in the Holcombe family collection and from discussions with Joe Holcombe and Paul Jeter along with notes compiled by Dr. Fred Holcombe and a check from Dr. J. G. Wannamaker Mfg. Co. to Lauren Glass Works, 15 April 1915 (original provided by Holcombe family). See also four Laurens Glass Ledger Books that list hundreds of mold numbers and the bottle brands for which Laurens produced bottles, originals in the collection of the SCSM. The State Museum is indebted to Robert Young, retired mold shop supervisor, for donating these to the museum in May 2002.

9. *Laurens Advertiser*, 8 Feb. 1922, from “Glass Works” file, Laurens County Library; for slow down prior to World War I see *Laurens Advertiser*, December 1914 (nd), copy on file at the Laurens County Library.

10. These examples are just a few of the many bottles represented in the Holcombe collection for this period.

11. *Laurens Advertiser*, 20 September 1911, 8 February 1922; for growth and increase in bottle production later in the decade see *Laurens Advertiser*, 7 October 1926, 6 January 1927.

12. This estimate is based on the production numbers given in 1925 and extrapolating numbers of fourteen to sixteen bottles per minute per day, then a week to a year.

13. “Former Employee Describes Changes in Glass Making.” The author is indebted to Paul Jeter of Columbia for his explanation of the hand tooled process and pinpointing when LGW fully mechanized bottle production; for details on early bottle production see *Laurens Advertiser*, 29 September 1911, and for increases in production in the following decade see *Laurens Advertiser*, 6 January 1927. For a concise chronological history of Laurens Glass mechanization from its beginning to 1970 see Julian H. Toulouse, *Bottle Makers and Their Marks* (Camden, NJ, Thomas Nelson, Inc., 1971), 324–26; for an idea on how much bottle production increased by the sixties with modern bottle machines (25 to 150 per minute depending on the size) see Scholes, *Modern Glass Practice*, 250; for a short but clear description of making bottles see “Making Glass Bottles,” The Indiana Historian, (September 1995), 8–9. The author is indebted to Coca Cola Archives in Atlanta, Georgia, for sharing a copy of this. For an interesting account of early bottle production at Laurens Glass as told to the Laurens paper by the Finkbeiner sons in the retirement years see *Laurens Advertiser*, 7 September 1966.


16. Family Number 535, Clarion County, 1910 Pennsylvania Census, Pennsylvania State Archives. The author thanks Emily Murphy of the latter institution for locating this. For more about the early work force at LGW see “Employee Describes Changes in Glass Making”; for details about the Finkbeiner families and Frank Barber see District 64, 15 A Laurens County, 1920 South Carolina Census on file at the SCDAH; for details about the family see *Laurens Advertiser*, 7 September 1966.
1966. The author is indebted to Elaine Martin of the Laurens County Library for passing this article on. For Creamer see Laurens Advertiser, 16 December 1914.

17. The author is grateful to Robert Young for the story of the Zupps. Young’s story, however, does not fit with the 1920 census of the Zupp family, so I have used the data from the latter to piece together the background to the family, see Laurens County, 1920 South Carolina Census, 15. Young apprenticed under George from 1959 to 1963, based on interview notes compiled with Robert Young, 9 May 2002, Anderson, SC, copy on file with at the SCSM.

18. Unidentified newscuttings, 29 October 1919, 16 December 1914, “Glass Works” file, Laurens County Library. For examples of unskilled workers and their race at LGW see Laurens County, 1920 South Carolina Census, 14B, 15A on file at SCDAH.


20. See Furman Parris interview; LGW workers Joseph C. Marler, William Burdette and Hugh Edwards interview with the author, Joe Holcombe, and Eddie Ive, 21 July 2001, Laurens, SC, transcripts on file at the SCSM, hereafter cited as LGW interview; other examples of long time service by Laurens employees see Totem Tales, May 1975, where Horace Garret, warehouse leadman, retired after forty-six years of continuous service.

21. For details about women employed at the plant see Charleston News and Courier, 28 January 1946 and Laurens Advertiser, 21 June 1996. Much more needs to be done to examine the role of women at LGW and how their duties evolved over the years.

22. On meeting of the local union in 1919 see Laurens Advertiser, 19 October 1919; for strike see Laurens Advertiser, 10, 15 November, 13 December 1951; see Parris interview and LGW interview for personnel recollections about strike actions. Although the records of the Glass, Molders, Pottery, Plastics & Allied Workers International Union in Media, Pa., the successor to the Glass Bottle Blowers Association, indicate that the Laurens local was not chartered with the national union until 1936 (see James H. Rankin [union president] to author, 26 March 2001, letter on file at the SCSM). The 1924 national convention of the Glass Bottle Blowers Ass., held in Atlantic City, New Jersey, shows that the Laurens’ work force paid dues to the national organization, see Minutes of the 48th Annual Convention of the Glass Bottle Blowers Association, July 7–17, 1924, 86, 91, in Box 12, Warshaw Collection, Archives Center, Smithsonian Institution.

23. Details of this strike came from Robert Young interview, 9 May 2002.

24. See Laurens Advertiser, 15 March 1928, for Albert Dial biography. There is so little documentation about the early development of the firm that there is little more than Dial’s obituary and circumstantial evidence to argue that he was the force behind LGW’s early growth. But the fact that he was the leader of the company for these early decades indicates he was an important factor. Further research will hopefully document just how significant he was.

25. See Parris interview and Young interview for observations about Easterby’s management style; for brief Easterby biography see Libby Rhodes, Images of America: Laurens (Charleston, SC, Arcadia Press, 2000), 71, and Laurens Advertiser, 8 May 1974.

26. See Parris interview, LGW interview, and Young interview for recollections on whimsy production. The many examples still extant are the only indications we have that this activity
existed. There are many varieties of these in the Holcombe collection, and other examples have appeared in auctions and flea markets.

27. LGW interview. The Holcombe collection has an example of this bottle.

28. See Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson to W. B. Matthews, Canada Dry, San Antonio, TX, 20 July 1963, original at Johnson Presidential Library, Austin, Texas, copy provided by Joe Holcombe. Two examples of this bottle are in the Holcombe collection and were exhibited at the SCSM from 2002 to 2003. One former employee told the author that before the bottles were shipped to Texas, members of the warehouse crew removed a box of empty bottles as keepsakes for some of the staff, anonymous interview, April 2002.

29. On Easterby’s public explanation for the merger see Laurens Advertiser, 28 August 1968; for employee observations about the merger see Parris interview and Young interview; “Ball-InCon Glass Packaging—Laurens,” South Carolina in Glass and US, Vol. 1 October 1990, copy in possession of the author.

30. The author is indebted to Furman Parris for sharing the first explanation, see Parris interview, and Robert Young for sharing the second, see Young interview.

31. For details and date of the plant’s last days see Laurens Advertiser, 21 June 1996, copy in “Glass Works” file, Laurens Public Library.
Righteous Lives: A Comparative Study
of the South Carolina Scalawag Leadership
During Reconstruction
Lewie Reece

Reconstruction was a profound revolutionary event in the political history of South Carolina. Where once government had been controlled by a small elite, under Reconstruction, the state came to experience a vibrant democracy. At the heart of that democracy was the leadership of the Republican Party, which dominated South Carolina politics from 1867 to 1877. Largely composed of African Americans, the Reconstruction Republican Party included only a small minority of white voters. While some of these white Republicans were carpetbaggers, many were native whites who, for a variety of reasons, associated with the Republican Party. Mocked as scalawags by their peers, they often played an important role in the workings of the party and played a key role in shaping its public policy, ideology, and electoral strategy.

This paper attempts to address the role of scalawag Republicans by examining four prominent scalawags who held positions of leadership: Simeon Corley, Edmund Mackey, Samuel Melton, and Alexander Wallace. All four of these men showed a willingness to extend to African Americans an opportunity to be treated as equals. Each developed close relationships with the African American community and was at least committed to political equality for African Americans. As a local party activist Corley encouraged African Americans to register to vote. Wallace aided African Americans in their struggles with racial violence in the upcountry. Melton and Mackey both served in the U.S. Attorney’s Office where they prosecuted white Democrats who denied the civil rights of African Americans. Their participation in the events of Reconstruction hardly ended their influence in South Carolina politics. All four remained involved in Republican politics and attempted to protect suffrage for African Americans and white Republicans. These scalawags in South Carolina were not simply political opportunists but rather sought the creation of a new, different kind of politics in the state.

Alexander Wallace’ early political career suggests the normal antebellum success story. Despite a limited education, he eventually became a successful planter and went on to serve several terms in the state legislature. When the war came Wallace evidently disapproved of secession enough to withdraw from public life and make no effort to serve in the Confederate Army. When the war was over he returned to
active participation in politics, being re-elected to the South Carolina legislature in 1865. Prior then to the passage of the Reconstruction Act of 1867, which gave the vote to African Americans, Wallace’s political career was little different from other South Carolina moderates. It is difficult to say precisely why he joined the Republican Party; possibly he saw it as an organization that best reflected the concerns of Southern Unionists. Yet once Wallace became a Republican he fully supported African American political participation. Wallace went on to serve four terms in Congress though as a congressman he kept a fairly low profile.¹

Yet from the very beginning Wallace was vigilant in addressing acts of violence against African American and white Republicans in the upcountry. Wallace fully supported the intervention of the federal government and worked with a congressional investigating committee that examined activities of the Ku Klux Klan in his congressional district. The massive federal intervention in York County seemed to unite white and African American Republicans. Democrats complained that in the 1872 congressional election some African Americans prevented others from voting against Wallace.²

In the aftermath of the federal intervention against the Klan, Wallace was a consistent advocate of a federal presence to enforce voting rights. In 1874 when Attorney General George Williams adopted a policy of reconciliation toward Klan violence, Wallace complained that in a period of ten months, “only three men have been arrested in York County charged with K.K. offenses.” Moreover, noting the upsurge of white paramilitary groups, Wallace demanded intervention from the Justice Department. In 1876 he struggled against tremendous odds to be re-elected to Congress; Redshirt paramilitary groups often directly attacked meetings that Wallace sought to lead. Wallace noted that these groups would “surround the meetings on horse back” and often had no purpose other than to break up gatherings of Republican voters. At one meeting they shouted down Wallace while physically threatening him.

In spite of Wallace’s best efforts to be re-elected, he was overwhelmed by the Democratic tide and was defeated. While Wallace’s defeat marked the end of his official public involvement in Republican politics, he remained sufficiently interested in voting rights to commend Attorney General Charles Devens for his prosecutions of Democrats in South Carolina. Wallace also cared enough about the proposed repeal of the Enforcement Acts, which protected the voting rights of southern Republicans, to urge Republican Congressman James Garfield to get Republicans to resist Democratic efforts at repeal. Tell the president to “stand firm” in the crisis wrote Wallace to Garfield in 1879, for South Carolina Republicans approved of the hard line national Republicans were taking on the issue. Thus Wallace’s support for voting rights was a consistent policy from which he never wavered.³
If Alexander Wallace’s political career demonstrates an enduring commitment to voting rights, the political activism of Edmund Mackey suggests the close connection between white and African American Republicans in the lowcountry. Edmund Mackey was the son of Albert Mackey, one of the more prominent Southern Unionists who resisted secession. In a long political career Mackey served as the sheriff of Charleston County, an alderman for the city of Charleston, a state legislator, an assistant U.S. Attorney, and a congressman. At the heart of Mackey’s political career was a close intimacy between himself and African American politicians and voters. Such closeness was perhaps best demonstrated during an election riot in Charleston in 1876 in which African Americans rushed to Mackey’s assistance to repel assaults by white Democrats. Yet for all Mackey’s radicalism there were clear limits, for he broke temporarily with the Republican organization to run for Congress as an Independent Republican in 1874. Mackey also strongly supported Governor Chamberlain in his efforts to reform and perhaps even deny some political appointments to African Americans. Yet when Republicans struggled for political survival in the election of 1876, Mackey strived to maintain the Republican organization and to prevent the Democratic takeover. As leader of Republicans in the state house, Mackey met the crisis of the competing houses with equanimity. It was hardly Mackey’s fault that in the end forces outside his control prevailed. Yet 1877 marked not the end of Mackey’s political career but rather a new phase of political activity.

When President Hayes recognized Wade Hampton as his official choice for governor, he also sought to appoint Republicans who would be acceptable to the new regime. The position of U. S. Attorney was extended to Lucius Northrop, a conservative Republican, whom Edmund Mackey’s uncle, the mercurial Thomas Jefferson Mackey, once described as a “republican by profession.” Northrop, in putting forward his name for the office, sought to make it clear that he distinctly disapproved of the “constant use of the bayonet.” As a result Mackey’s selection as an Assistant U.S. Attorney was no doubt seen by Hayes as something of a sop to party regulars in South Carolina. As an Assistant U.S. Attorney Mackey proved to be a vigorous advocate of using the law as a means to achieve justice for African American and white Republicans. Such advocacy soon provoked the ire of the Charleston News and Courier. Mackey took great pains to point out to Attorney General Charles Devens that the complaints of the publisher, Democratic politician Francis W. Dawson, were the concerns of the guilty, who had directly participated in fraudulent ballot box stuffing.

Further, along with U. S. Marshal R. M. Wallace, Mackey took an interest in protecting the life of African American Republican Edmund Deas. Deas, a prominent Darlington County legislator, was arrested as part of a campaign of intimidation and
coercion launched by Democrats in the aftermath of the brutal 1878 elections. While Northrop did nothing to prevent Deas from being arrested and detained for several months, Mackey and Wallace made consistent efforts to secure his release. As Deas ruefully noted, “Mackey and Wallace & others had been advising him to take steps in my interest but he would not do it.” A consistent willingness to help Deas suggests Mackey’s personal connections with African American Republican politicians in general. It was this kind of relationship that could have induced Robert Smalls to endorse Edmund Mackey as a compromise candidate for a congressional Republican nomination in a district designed to elect an African American. That Mackey could be so readily accepted by African American delegates in the 1880 election also suggests that his political and personal conduct built a reputation of trust. Years after Mackey died—all too young—his old friend and African American Republican Congressman Thomas E. Miller complained that since the “death of Mackey” not enough was done to keep Republican voters listed on the registration rolls. That Mackey’s death could be used to mark the end of an era says a great deal about the impact he made on lowcountry Republican politics.5

Like his fellow scalawags, Simeon Corley too served in Congress, but he maintained more of a local orientation to Lexington County throughout his political career. Unlike the other three Republicans described in this paper, Corley was not someone who was born into a prominent family nor did he have an antebellum political career. Corley’s early training was that of a tailor. In his autobiography Corley makes it clear that he took an interest in the issues of secession and Union in the prewar years. An advocate of temperance, abolition, and preserving the Union at all costs, Corley faced constant challenges. When secession did finally become a reality, Corley accepted it begrudgingly and evidently resented being “compelled to enter the Confederate army.” At the end of the war, when Corley returned to South Carolina, his uncompromising Unionism made him “a lover of the Union,” and it was with real enthusiasm that he took the oath of allegiance to the United States.6

Corley’s voice was not one that was heeded in South Carolina in 1865. Corley described his being defeated as a delegate to the constitutional convention that year as being primarily due to his “demanding more for colored men.” After the passage of the Reconstruction Act, Corley became involved in the organization of the Republican Party, especially in Lexington County. Early party building took place fairly quickly in established urban centers such as Columbia and Charleston, but outside those areas it required a more persistent effort. Aiding the party’s efforts was the fact that many white conservatives refused to participate in the new registration of voters—as the Reconstruction Act required—and boycotted the elections held in 1868.
Yet a sufficient number of white Union voters did participate in Lexington County, and Corley claimed a “majority of white voters” cast ballots for the Republican ticket. Corley clearly saw political affairs in South Carolina as an opportunity to arrive at a new start for both whites and African Americans in the state. “The wants of the white and colored race are precisely alike—their interests are identical.” In Corley’s view then, Republican policies were designed to aid the poor of both races. To deny rights to African Americans would only result in raising up those who would injure the rights not only of blacks but of whites as well. Thus, as a delegate to the Constitutional Convention of 1868, Corley advocated African American property ownership. While a member of Congress, he spoke in favor of the ratification of the fifteenth amendment to guarantee African American voting rights. He called for new approaches to public policy questions.7

The demise of Reconstruction did not mark the end of Corley’s participation in politics. The election of 1880 proved to be critical at both the state and local levels, especially in Lexington County. Corley attempted to inform national political figures of the difficulties of South Carolina Republicans and also fought with both white and African American Republicans against the entrenched power structure of the Democratic party. In the summer of 1880 Corley made a concerted effort to suggest the need of the national Republican Party’s direct intervention. Corley believed that after Hayes betrayed South Carolina Republicans by handing over the state to Hampton, the result had been four years of despotism, which made Republicans eager to “throw off the shackles by which they are illegally bound.” Corley also felt that if Republicans failed in this campaign it would mean “our last hope for good government is gone.” He therefore suggested to presidential nominee James Garfield the importance of sending two or three good speakers who could campaign in each county and encourage Republicans to surge to the polls. Corley’s suggestions evidently attracted considerable discussion at the headquarters of the national party, for William Chandler, who served as the defacto campaign manager for Garfield, suggested that Corley’s ideas had merit. Yet Chandler concluded that there was an insufficient amount of time to “arouse the whole state” and, as a result, Corley and South Carolina Republicans were effectively on their own. Republicans did make a massive effort to carry the state for Garfield but were stymied everywhere by multiple acts of fraud by Democratic election officials. Yet in the aftermath of the election, Corley remained hopeful and sought to convince President-elect Garfield of the necessity of using federal power to ensure “honest and fair elections.” Corley remained committed then to the issues of civil rights, which he believed would help to create a new kind of politics in South Carolina.8
Such activity carried the price of being an object of both physical and legal persecution by the Democrats. Democrats in the county suggested to Corley that he ought to go by the jail and pick out his cell. Turning to the one lawyer who, he believed, could influence a jury in Lexington County, one who would be able to stand up to the “bulldozing influences which will be brought to bear upon it by the political lawyers of the bar,” Corley wrote to beg the influence of Samuel Melton. Few political alliances could seem more odd than that between Corley, the impassioned tribune of the poor, and Melton, the suave, sophisticated attorney with ties to the South Carolina aristocracy. What united these men was their politics, for in his own quiet way Melton was just as committed to civil rights as was Corley. Melton was a graduate of South Carolina College; he had developed a reputation as a gifted attorney in the prewar years, was a state legislator, and thus was connected to the political establishment in the state. When the secession crisis came, Melton, like many moderates, accepted its reality. In fact, unlike Corley, Melton eagerly embraced the Confederate cause and served as a colonel in the Confederate Army. Melton evidently was a true believer, for as late as March 1865 he was writing his wife that the suffering and pain of the South was a good thing in that it would make people “patriotic & true.” Yet Melton accepted the demise of the Confederacy with good grace and, after passage of the Reconstruction Act, entered the Republican Party. In all likelihood he did so not out of a commitment to equality but more as an act of pragmatism.

Through most of the Reconstruction period Melton preferred to remain in the background. Melton was clearly a moderate Republican but still a party regular. Melton was willing to publicly laud African American Congressman Robert Elliott for a speech in support of the radical Civil Rights Act of 1875. Yet Melton came to public recognition more for his close friendship with Daniel Chamberlain, who was elected governor in 1874. Melton and Chamberlain were involved in the ownership of the Daily Union Herald, a leading Republican newspaper, and formed a political partnership that sought to reform the Republican Party. On such a platform Melton was elected Attorney General of South Carolina in 1874 and remained a close ally of Chamberlain for the next year. It was when Melton became convinced that Chamberlain was more interested in appeasing Democrats than reforming the party that he ended his alliance with Chamberlain and eventually resigned as attorney general.

Like the other Republicans discussed in this paper, Melton’s political career did not dead end with the Democratic seizure of power in 1877; rather it took a new form. In the immediate aftermath of redemption, Democrats began a concerted program of persecution against the state Republican Party. They conducted count-
less investigations and filed frivolous charges of bribery, misconduct, and fraud against Republicans, hoping that the sheer volume of such suits could induce the federal government to stop prosecuting Democrats who participated in election riots. As one of the few Republicans Democrats would heed, Melton had to negotiate with Democrats in an effort to stop their campaign of persecution. In fact, Melton became a mediator between Governor Wade Hampton and President Rutherford B. Hayes. It was a task that Melton found useful in that eventually he was able to move Hampton to a compromise solution. Yet Melton evidently found absurd Hampton’s contention that former Treasurer Francis Cardozo and Congressman Robert Smalls, both African American politicians, were guilty of massive fraud. The prosecution of Cardozo, Melton told Hayes, was “monstrous,” and he served as Cardozo’s attorney at trial. Yet the eventual compromise, which involved an end to both state and federal prosecutions and the pardoning of Republicans convicted before Hampton’s kangaroo courts, brought the issue to an end. Melton accepted the compromise partly because he believed Hampton would allow fair elections in South Carolina and might even serve Republican interests. Hampton, Melton told President Hayes, was “desirous of having a strong and intelligent representation of our party in the Legislature” and having conceded an “honest ballot and a fair count” it might once more be possible to count “South Carolina for the Republic.” Melton’s estimate of Hampton was overly optimistic, but in all likelihood Melton did much to end the campaign of persecution.11

Melton remained an important figure in South Carolina politics throughout the next decade. Serving as U.S. Attorney in the Garfield and Arthur administrations Melton made real efforts to end violations of voting rights. Despite being well aware of the difficulties of prosecuting election cases before juries of white Democrats, he remained vigorous in his attempts to do so during his tenure as U.S. Attorney. Almost alone in a fight with the whole apparatus of the Democratic party of the state, Melton concluded, “this effort must be made.” He was aware that as an “unflinching Republican” his views were all but discounted before a jury. Yet the larger interest of trying to secure the voting rights of African Americans and whites made that effort worthwhile. The results were in many ways predictable; juries refused to convict, but Melton’s determination reflected a willingness to try to secure the full meaning of national citizenship for all people in South Carolina.12

An examination of the political careers of these four Republicans demonstrates a clear pattern. All four remained consistent advocates of civil rights, especially of voting rights, and while one can see necessity motivating some of their actions, certainly the intensity of their actions suggests that they came to their positions freely.
Moreover, their advocacy of civil rights carried with it close association with African Americans. This is not to suggest that these Republicans overcame all racial prejudice, but their party activity made them willing to extend full political rights to African Americans. In their approach to political issues then, these scalawags fully accepted the idea of civic equality and remained committed to full public participation. Opportunism simply cannot explain the depth of their political careers nor the degree to which they remained involved in the issues of Reconstruction. Simeon Corley put it best when articulating this new politics in 1868, “Old South Carolina, politically as it was, is dead and buried with the past. New South Carolina, as it is, lives, and will continue to live on the bright pages of history in the future, as a free, progressive State of this great sisterhood, to the end of time.”

ENDNOTES


3. D. T. Corbin to George H. Williams, 28 March 1874; A. S. Wallace to Williams, 18 September 1874; Wallace to Alphonso Taft, 25 August 1876; Wallace to Taft, 8 September 1876; Wallace to Charles Devens, 18 October 1878, Letters Received by the Department of Justice from South Carolina, Record Group 60, National Archives (hereinafter cited as LRDJSC); A. S. Wallace to James A. Garfield, 5 May 1879, James A. Garfield Papers, Library of Congress (hereinafter cited as Garfield Papers). For a good discussion of the retrenchment in federal policy cf. Nieman, Promises, 89–90. For the 1876 campaign of violence cf. Richard N. Current, Those Terrible


6. For information about Corley’s prewar views cf. Simeon Corley to Charles Lanman, 28 July 1868; Short Sketch of the Life of Simeon Corley, 1869, Simeon Corley Papers, South Caroliniana Library, University of South Carolina (hereinafter cited as Corley Papers); and Foner, Reconstruction, 299.

7. Robert B. Elliott to Charles Sumner, 22 May 1867; Simeon Corley to Sumner, 10 December 1867; B. F. Randolph to Sumner, 23 November 1867; Christopher C. Bowen to Sumner, 22 May 1867; Simeon Corley to Sumner, 25 November 1867; Corley to Sumner, 5 July 1867; Charles Sumner Papers, Houghton Library, Harvard University; Simeon Corley, “To the Voters of the Third Congressional District of South Carolina,” 4 April 1868, Corley Papers; Simeon Corley, Right of Suffrage (1869). For the lack of participation by many white Democrats in politics in the period cf. Perman, Reunion, 269–336; Williamson, After Slavery, 351–53; and Julie Saville, The Work of Reconstruction: From Slave to Wage Laborer in South Carolina, 1860–1870 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 151–95.

9. Simeon Corley to Samuel W. Melton, 25 May 1881, LRDJSC; Samuel W. Melton to Mrs. Melton, 20 December 1860; Melton to Mrs. Melton, 25 April 1861; Melton to Mrs. Melton, 18 March 1865, Samuel W. Melton Papers, South Caroliniana Library, University of South Carolina; Williamson, After Slavery, 374.


10. F. L. Cardozo to R. B. Hayes, 7 May 1878; Samuel W. Melton to Hayes, 22 May 1878; Wade Hampton to Hayes, 25 March 1878; Melton to Hayes, 8 April 1878; William E. Earle to D. T. Corbin, 9 March 1878, Hayes Papers; Williamson, After Slavery, 414–16; Cooper, Conservative Regime, 29–32.


Despite witnessing the carnage in Europe for over two and a half years, the United States was not prepared for military involvement in the First World War when President Woodrow Wilson sent his request for a declaration of war to Congress on 2 April 1917. Consequently, the army had to devise measures to expand its forces from less than one hundred thirty-five thousand soldiers to several million as quickly as possible. The army used new recruits, draftees procured through the 1917 Selective Service Act, and the nation’s National Guard units. When the government federalized the National Guard and placed it at the War Department’s disposal in July 1917, each state knew it would have to play a role in supporting the war effort.

Secretary of War Newton Baker decided in early August to emphasize the importance of a truly national effort and directed “that a division of the National Guard composed of units which have the most efficient and best trained personnel, be selected from various States and organized for immediate service in France.”¹ His objective was to create a division around which the country could rally.² Ultimately the 42nd, or as it was nicknamed, the Rainbow Division, comprised soldiers from twenty-six states and the District of Columbia.³ The Palmetto state contributed the 1st Separate South Carolina Engineer Battalion to the 117th Engineer Regiment, 42nd Division.⁴ These engineers participated in most of the major American engagements, won acclaim for their hard work and dedication to duty, and helped make the allied victory possible.

Since the South Carolina battalion had served in Mexico in 1916, the War Department saw these men as a source for engineers in the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF). In May 1917 it asked Governor Richard Manning to organize engineering units as quickly as possible.⁵ Manning immediately asked J. M. Johnson, chairman of the State Highway Commission and commander of the 1st Battalion, to recruit soldiers to fill his unit, Company A, and to create two new companies, B and C. Johnson quickly filled Company A in Marion and established Companies B and C in Columbia and Spartanburg, respectively.⁶ The companies trained at their home bases until mid-August then came together at Camp Sevier in Greenville for two weeks of training.⁷

In late August the War Department named the three companies the 1st Battalion, 117th Engineer Regiment, 42nd Division.⁸ Altogether 736 officers and men—
about five hundred from South Carolina and the rest mainly from North Carolina and Tennessee—were in the 1st Battalion when it traveled to Camp Alfred L. Mills on Long Island to join the rest of the 42nd Division. The division trained at Camp Mills in the rudiments of being doughboys—the nickname for the American soldiers—for six weeks before it sailed for Europe in mid-October. Training began early each day with reveille at 5:30, breakfast, and drill between 7:30 and 11:30. The soldiers broke for lunch, resumed drill from 1:15 to 4:30, and had dinner at 6:00. Taps was sounded at 9:45. Aside from extended practice marches on Mondays and Fridays, the schedule remained the same for the entire six weeks. In the first week soldiers had to march between five and six miles without packs. By the end of the fourth week, they marched eight miles fully equipped. Beyond marching, their training revolved around close order drills, instruction in their specific areas of expertise—such as infantry, artillery, or engineering—and first aid.

The division left Camp Mills on 18 October for its two-week voyage to France. Although the on-board schedule was not physically demanding, the soldiers often stood in line for hours to get food, experienced repeated abandon ship drills, and were allowed on deck usually only for an hour or less a day. To make matters worse, the ships were dreadfully overcrowded. One soldier exclaimed, “Soldiers everywhere, no place to sit, no place to stand. A nice brisk walk? Impossible. . . . Oh for the roominess of a sardine can.” Another doughboy remembered that the men were “Crowded like horses into narrow bunks, with the plainest of food, in total darkness at night, denied even the solace of a cigarette except by daylight, always having boat drills—it was the Rainbow Division’s first test in stern discipline.”

The fact that many men had never sailed on the ocean before compounded the problem of overcrowding. After arriving in Europe one Rainbow officer recommended that for future trips, “Suitable vomit cans or buckets should be placed in sufficient numbers” to meet the needs of the men. The soldiers offered the rationale for this recommendation, as one recalled—“the floors were covered with the vomit of troops who had yet to find their sea legs.” Another soldier “wished the boat was any place but on the surface of the water.”

Problems with food preparation made the seasickness worse. A sergeant recalled, “in line for food it was so crowded you were lucky to get a meal every 24 hrs.” The commander of an ambulance section in the division described the conditions on-board ship as “nothing short of vile.” It is, he added

impossible for the men to even keep an outward appearance of cleanliness. Beans last night were sour and this morning there
was a resulting diarrhea. The seating capacity of the water closets under normal conditions are so inadequate that men stand for hours waiting to relieve themselves.23

Once in Europe, the AEF’s focus was on preparing the soldiers for combat. But first it had to overcome the difficulties of transporting them to their training areas. Ultimately, most traveled on the infamous French railroad cars, better known as Hommes 40, Chevaux 8. One engineer wrote, “The boat was heaven compared to the train.”24 The boxcars were designed to carry either 40 men or eight horses, but as one soldier recalled, they were “crowded and uncomfortable as hell.”25 Another remembered that overcrowding and cold weather made it impossible to sleep,26 and another that it was “so crowded we had to sleep spoon fashion—when one turned over, all had to turn.”27

Once the division arrived at its destination in northeast France, the engineers’ primary task was to construct field fortifications, roads, and buildings.28 Ultimately, however, they had to become adept in a variety of skills. From November 1917 to mid-February 1918, they spent most of their time constructing hospitals, barracks, bath houses, dugouts, latrines, mess halls, and target ranges.29 They also received limited training in trench warfare, marksmanship, marches, and close order drill.30

The division moved into the trenches in the Luneville sector of the front in mid-February and stayed there or in neighboring Baccarat for the next four months. It trained with the French for about a month,31 but after the German spring offensive began on 21 March, the French were withdrawn to meet the threat, and the division was given control of the sector.32 While in the quiet sector, the engineers practiced digging trenches and building and maintaining fortifications.33 The division was responsible for about a seven-mile stretch, and the defenders strung barbed wire entanglements in layers in front of the trenches, usually within fifty yards of their own positions.34

Building and maintaining the defensive positions was endless, and while the infantry faced risks, the engineers’ activities placed them in similar danger. Routinely, they built and maintained trenches, dugouts, roads, barracks, artillery and machine gun positions, and observation posts.35 One engineer explained:

They built dugouts in record time, they directed the digging of new trenches, and the repairs of old ones, they put in or repaired barbed wire entanglements in No Man’s Land under the machine gun menace of the enemy. They ran sawmills and repaired roads under shell fire. They learned gas defense and how to dodge shells. They built bridges and light railways and barracks.36
This routine work occasionally became more dangerous. In the Baccarat sector the enemy commonly used artillery to shell the American trenches. Although these attacks were made usually only to harass, they did create extra work and raise anxieties because now the engineers had to make additional repairs under fire. One soldier wrote in March 1917, “I cannot describe the sound of a shell traveling thru the air. It is a combination of a scream, a moan, a sigh and a screech.” He added, “I thought I was going through hell on earth. Just waiting for a big shell to put you out of your misery. Just at present I am a nervous wreck, after four days and nights of bombarding, who wouldn’t be.” And the damage inflicted was often severe. “Raid and artillery action,” one engineer wrote, “meant plenty of work for the engineers. Cavend in trenches, badly damaged dugouts and improper drainage gave plenty to do during the day, leaving the night hours for the repairing of torn-up wire entanglements that had suffered from enemy fire.” This additional work, however, paled in comparison to the human toll. After one German barrage in March, engineers frantically tried to dig out buried soldiers. What they found was sometimes horrifying:

Two of the boys had carefully removed the first body. . . . Then Harold Lorden and I got a litter ready, and we each grabbed hold of a leg to drag out the second fellow. We pulled, but the leg in Lorden’s hands was not fastened to the poor devil’s body, and Lorden went sprawling over backwards, the leg hitting him squarely in the face.

These types of casualties, although rare in a quiet sector, were an all-too-frequent reminder of the realities of war. The 42nd Division experienced other types of wartime realities by choice on other occasions. Numerous times during its stay in Baccarat, units from the division launched raids against the German trenches. The engineers provided valuable assistance for raiding parties. First, they made maps of the areas targeted for raids. Second, they built practice trenches for training based on aerial photography of the German lines. Finally, they often volunteered to go on the raids to demolish targets in the German lines.

Camden native Corporal Mannie Forte participated in a raid on 3 May. He explained that the objectives of the raid were to penetrate to his [the Germans’] third line about six or seven hundred yards, kill everything we saw, blow up his dugouts, take his machine guns and blow up their nests, and in other words demolish everything.

Corporal George Browne captured the mood of the raiders:
Our raiding party arrived in the front line at about 3:15 A.M. . . . It was a starlight morning but rather misty. As we entered the first line there was practically no shelling but several machine guns in the rear kept up a steady fire. After getting into position we still had about a half hours wait as zero hour was 4 A.M. At 3:45 A.M it commenced to get light a little and we all commenced to get a little cold and nervous.

He then explained that once the artillery barrage started at 4:00 A.M., “it seemed impossible that we had to go out in such a Hell as was in front of us. It seemed as if the shells came from every direction at once as I think they did and thru all the pop-popping of machine guns.”

The artillery fire was devastatingly effective as the raiders found the German trenches “completely destroyed. Its trenches were filled, all works above ground leveled, wire entanglements torn down, and the forest itself turned into almost a bare field.” Browne remembered coming “to the edge of woods again where we had been taught the German front line was. I couldn’t for the life of me find any trace of trenches. Nothing at all left of them. I have never seen such destruction before. The largest trees even 18 inches in diameter broken off anywhere from the ground up.”

In the end, the raid achieved the objective of destroying some German positions but failed in producing any prisoners. For the soldiers who experienced it, however, it left them feeling like “veterans who had tasted the reality of war.”

The engineers and rest of the division’s duties in Baccarat ended in June 1918 when they moved to the Champagne region of France to meet the last German offensive of the war. Through a variety of intelligence gathering, the French had learned the time and date of the attack. The French with American assistance developed an elastic defense strategy to meet the German threat. The idea was to absorb the German attacks by establishing three lines of defense. French volunteers, who were supposed to provide warning of the offensive and then slow the attackers, manned the first line. Approximately a mile and a half behind this first line was the main line of defense. The 42nd Division’s infantry regiments were placed here alongside French soldiers. Reserve forces remained another half mile back. South Carolina’s engineers and others were part of these reserves. After several days of intense fighting, beginning on 15 July, the German attack quickly floundered in the teeth of these defenses, and the 42nd Division was withdrawn from the front.

The division was then almost immediately ordered to participate in the Aisne-Marne Offensive. On 25 July the engineers moved to a region near the Ourcq River to prepare the way for the rest of the division. While the battle to cross the Ourcq was the
The 42nd Division’s costliest in terms of casualties, it is also one of the least known. The headline in the Charleston News and Courier on 30 July 1918 read, “River Ourcq Runs Red with Blood Where Americans Triumph Over Prussian Guard.” South Carolina engineers and the others in the 117th Engineer Regiment supplied part of that blood.

The engineers played a role in the division’s advance across the Ourcq. Their principal missions were building and maintaining roads to the front and constructing bridges over the river. They built two bridges over the river despite facing snipers and machine gunners well hidden in the underbrush up the slope, yet . . . [the Germans] were unable to break up the daring work of the bridge builders, who daily faced snipers, machine guns and big shells in the execution of their work.

Once the 42nd Division’s infantry pushed the Germans back, the engineers again maintained the roads and bridges and waited anxiously as infantry reserves. On 1 August, Companies A and B, 117th Engineers, were given orders that they were to act as infantry beginning the next morning. The engineers looked forward to the attack because they wanted to show the rest of the division they were capable infantrymen. By the time they were relieved on 3 August, the engineers had advanced further than any other unit in the division.

The importance of the engineers at the Battle of the Ourcq cannot be overstated. As one colonel later explained, “They did their work as engineers in a manner beyond criticism and we used them in the line as infantry. Yes, they lost some men, but they were glad to be in the fight.” Praise even more glowing came from Major General Clement Flagler, the future commander of the Rainbow Division. In a citation to the 117th Engineer Regiment, he wrote:

The engineers were everywhere, in the advance, on the flanks, in the rear. It was the engineers who made possible the retention of the narrow strip along the north bank of the Ourcq. Time after time the bridges over the Ourcq were shot away, and time after time they were replaced by the engineers. And then when more troops were needed to strike the final blow that broke the backbone of the German resistance, it was the engineers, hastily gathered together from all over the divisional area, that struck it. They dropped their tools, picked up their rifles and advanced to the heights overlooking the Vesle [River], taking the town of Chery-Chartreuve. They reached the farthest point of advance of any dismounted elements of the Rainbow Division.
Unfortunately, the engineers’ duties near the Ourcq were not over on 3 August. Besides the usual responsibilities of fixing roads, they had one other grueling task—they had to police the battlefield.61 During its fighting in July and early August, the 42nd Division experienced over five thousand casualties.62 As one soldier recorded in his diary, “Dead bodies were all around me . . . It sure brings war & all its horrors home like nothing else could.”63 A Rainbow veteran writing at the time explained how, “the odor of dead things permeates the atmosphere everywhere.”64 One other doughboy wrote a particularly poignant letter: “One cannot believe the misery a person is in when they walk around seeing bodies everywhere and then realizing you may be one of them anytime.”65

After the engineers finished with these unpleasant duties, they rejoined the division, and for the first time since arriving in France in November 1917, they had a genuine rest period.66 It was fairly short, however, for by the end of August, they were ordered to begin preparations for the first American offensive of the war at St. Mihiel.67

The objectives in this offensive were to collapse the St. Mihiel salient and capture or kill as many Germans as possible.68 The 42nd Division was assigned to the IV Army Corps, First American Army, and given responsibility for a two-mile-wide sector of the front.69 The conditions at the front were extremely difficult. Father Francis Duffy, the Rainbow Division chaplain, remembered that men “moved to the jump-off point on the night of September 11th. The rain was falling in torrents. The roads were like a swamp and the night was so dark that a man could not see the one in front of him.”70 Another Rainbow veteran wrote:

For days the rain has been pouring down. . . . Water! Water! Water! It runs, it trickles, it oozes from everything, everywhere. The long column of infantry had been on the march for five black, miserable nights, drenched to the skin, splashing, squashing its way through the heavy liquid mud.”71

The diarist for the division’s Signal Platoon wrote, “It was a pitch-black night, with a steady rain falling, and the mud was ankle deep. The roads were congested with traffic, and progress was well-nigh impossible.”72

The muddy mess probably affected the engineers the most. There is no question that everyone was wet and miserable, but the engineers were the ones responsible for maintaining the inundated trenches, roads, and dugouts. One of the division’s infantry recalled that the engineers “labored incessantly” to keep the roads in the best shape possible.73 For the attack, the engineers were divided between the division’s two infantry brigades—the 83rd and 84th—with most of those from South Carolina working with the former.74 In the 117th Engineers “Companies A, B, D, and E had
one platoon of wire cutters, each at work cutting chicanes in our own wire and guiding the infantry to position, one platoon each assisting the tanks and two platoons with accompanying artillery. These engineering platoons guided the infantry, destroyed obstacles, and maintained roads throughout the attack.

The efforts of the engineers helped make the First American Army’s initial offensive a success. With the salient reduced, the 42nd Division moved to participate in the greatest American attack of the war, the Meuse-Argonne Offensive. While its involvement in the attack on St. Mihiel precluded its participation in the opening stages of the Meuse-Argonne, it soon joined the fray in early October.

For most of the first half of October the division served as infantry reserves, but on 12 October it moved to the front lines. This move was a particularly sobering experience for all the men in the division, for the horrors of the previous weeks of fighting on this battlefield were in evidence everywhere. One doughboy recalled:

Our route lay through the most devastated area I have ever seen, forests and towns reduced to splinters and rubble, and mud, deep mud, everywhere. . . . Any semblance to a woods had totally disappeared. It was a sea of mud and stumps.

A colonel wrote in his diary, “The desolation of the battlefield is beyond description. Many dead Americans and Germans everywhere. Dead horses along every road. Every building and tree destroyed and the ground one mass of muddy shell holes.”

General John “Blackjack” Pershing, the commander of the AEF, ordered the 42nd and several other divisions to renew the offensive on 14 October against the strongest position in the German lines. Father Duffy wrote:

It was a well prepared and strongly wired position consisting of three lines of wires and trenches. The first rows of wire were breast high and as much as twenty feet wide, all bound together in small squares by iron supports so that it was almost impossible for artillery to destroy it unless the whole ground was beaten flat.

The engineers served as wire cutters, infantry reserves, and road builders in the attack. They actually preceded the infantry in order to cut paths through the layers of barbed wire. While they were successful in cutting the obstacles, “Bodies littered the ground and corpses were hanging on the wire.” One infantryman observing the 117th’s activities remarked:

Some of our regular engineers tried to cut a passage through the wire, covered by riflemen and several of our machine guns. But
the Germans were firing from concealed pill boxes behind the first belt of wires. . . . Their machine gun fire killed or wounded all those engineers. 

Besides acting as wire cutters, the engineers had to maintain old roads and build new ones. These tasks proved even more difficult as the American infantry advanced because the newly conquered territory consisted of one shell hole after another.

By the end of 16 October the attack had run its course, and the AEF entered a two-week period of consolidating positions, rest, recovery, and retraining. The AEF had suffered at all levels, and it needed this time before it could renew its offensive. The men were so exhausted that even minor ailments were debilitating. Every division was short of soldiers. For example, the Rainbow Division needed an additional 7,600 men in late October to fill its ranks. Although not on the offensive, they still suffered. Father Duffy later explained:

The two weeks that elapsed between October 16th and November 1st were the dreariest, draggiest days we spent in the war. The men lay out on the bare hillsides in little pits they had dug for themselves, the bottoms of which were turned into mud by frequent rains. . . . They were dirty, lousy, thirsty; often hungry; and nearly every last man was sick.

On 1 November, the AEF renewed its offensive against the Germans with the 42nd Division in reserve. On 5 November, the division moved back to the front and remained there until 9 November. The AEF, as a whole, had much more success in these attacks than previously in the Meuse-Argonne Offensive. Yet the costs of the offensive proved incredibly high. Over the course of forty-seven days of fighting, the United States suffered 120,000 casualties, including over 4,200 in the Rainbow Division and 91 in the 117th Engineers.

After the 11 November armistice, the 42nd was one of several divisions assigned temporary occupation duty in Germany. While the engineers engaged in some building projects, most of them, like the rest of the doughboys, simply wanted to go home. The division stayed in Germany until the middle of April 1919 when it set sail for New York City. Once there, the 1st Battalion took a train to Columbia. In early May, the engineers returned to their homes, and the 42nd Division took its place in history.

The 42nd Division and its engineers served in France longer than all but two other American divisions and participated in the most important U.S. engagements. While the Rainbow Division’s history has been told, very little has actually been written about its engineers. Unfortunately, this is true of all the engineers in World War
I; their story has never been told in the detail it needs and deserves. They served with dedication, and, unfortunately, many paid the ultimate price. South Carolina’s engineers provided valuable service to the American Expeditionary Forces by constructing trenches, building defensive fortifications, clearing paths for attacks, and maintaining roads and bridges during allied operations. Without their commitment and efforts, victory for the allies would have been much more difficult and costly.

ENDNOTES

1. Tasker H. Bliss to Commanding Generals, All Departments, 1 August 1917, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Archives—Love Library [hereafter UNLA], Rainbow Division Collection [hereafter RDC], Rainbow Division Veterans Association [hereafter RDVA], World War I, Box 1, Folder 9, 1.


3. James J. Cooke, The Rainbow Division in the Great War, 1917–1919 (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1994), 4. For a complete breakdown of the various units that made up the 42nd Division, see Tasker H. Bliss to Commanding Generals, All Departments, 1 August 1917, 1.


7. “Johnson’s Engineers Have Gone to Greenville Camp,” The Marion Star, 22 August 1917, 1.


11. Ibid., 1.

12. General Orders No. 5, 7 September 1917, National Archives of the United States [hereafter NA], Record Group [hereafter RG] 120, World War I, Organizational Records, 42nd Division, Box 18, Folder—42nd Division—Training Program 1917, 1–3.

13. General Orders No. 5 (MacArthur), 18 September1917, NA, RG 120, World War I, Organizational Records, 42nd Division, Box 25, Folder—84th Infantry Brigade—Historical Data 1917, 1–2.


16. Elmer Frank Straub, A Sergeant’s Diary in The World War: The Diary of an Enlisted Member of the

17 Wilbur C. Peterson, “Memories of Rainbow,” UNLA, RDC, RDVA, World War I, Box 2, Folder 14, 5–6.


19. Commanding General, 84th Brigade, 42nd Division, 5 November 1917, NA, RG 120, World War I, Organizational Records, 42nd Division, Box 25, Folder—84th Infantry Brigade Historical Data 1917, 1.


22. Benjamin Leo Bory, Army Service Experiences Questionnaire, United States Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PN, Box 42nd Division #3, 67th Field Artillery Brigade, Folder—WWI—5996, Bory, Benjamin L., 5.

23. C.O. Ambulance Section, 117th Sanitary Train to Commanding General, 84th Infantry Brigade, 20 October 1917, NA, RG 120, World War I, Organizational Records, 42nd Division, Box 25, Folder—84th Infantry Brigade Historical Data 1917, 1.

24. George E. Browne to Martha Johnson, 17 November 1917 in author’s possession.


29. Memorandum to Chief Engineer, AEF, 3 December 1917, NA, RG 120, World War I, Organizational Records, 42nd Division, Box 40—117th Engineer Regiment, Folder—117th Engineers History, 1.

30. See Memorandum to Chief Engineer, AEF, 3 February 1918, NA, RG 120, World War I, Organizational Records, 42nd Division, Box 40—117th Engineer Regiment, Folder—117th Engineers History, 1; and “History of the 117th Engineers Story of Training and Fighting,” The Marion Star, 19 March 1919, 1.

31. Commanding General, 42nd Division to Commanding General, First Army Corps, 21 December 1918, UNLA, RDC, RDVA, World War I, Box 2, Folder 4, 1.

32. United States Army in the World War, Volume 1, 12–3.

33. Sadler, California Rainbow Memories, 25.

35. See Memorandum to Chief Engineer, AEF, 2 April 1918, NA, RG 120, World War I, Organizational Records—42nd Division, Box 40—117th Engineer Regiment, Folder—117th Engineers History, 1; Memorandum to Chief Engineer, AEF, 2 May 1918, NA, RG 120, World War I, Organizational Records—42nd Division, Box 40—117th Engineer Regiment, Folder—117th Engineers History, 1; Memorandum to Chief Engineer, AEF, 5 June 1918, NA, RG 120, World War I, Organizational Records—42nd Division, Box 40—117th Engineer Regiment, Folder—117th Engineers History, 1; Memorandum to Chief Engineer, AEF, 6 July 1918, NA, RG 120, World War I, Organizational Records—42nd Division, Box 40—117th Engineer Regiment, Folder—117th Engineers History, 1; and Cooke, Rainbow Division, 87.


37. Henry J. Reilly, Americans All: The Rainbow at War (Columbus, OH: F. J. Heer Printing Co., 1936), 123.


43. “How We Went ‘Over the Top,’” 5.

44. George E. Browne to Martha Johnson, 12 May 1918, in author’s possession.


46. Browne to Johnson, 12 May 1918.

47. Diary of Signal Platoon, Headquarters Co., 166th Infantry, 42nd Rainbow Division, UNLA, RDC, RDVA Papers, World War I, Box 2, Folder 7, 4.


There is considerable disagreement about how big the Ourcq River was. Normally, it was about twenty feet wide and less than two feet deep. Several sources, however, indicate that the river was swollen by rains and was as much as forty-five feet wide and twelve feet deep. More than likely it was closer to the first assessment.

55. Cooke, Rainbow Division, 131–32.
56. Memorandum, 1 August 1918, in United States Army in the World War, Volume 5, 527.
57. Reilly, Americans All, 343.
58. Summary of Intelligence, No. 118, 1–2 August 1918 in United States Army in the World War, Volume 5, 528.
60. Ibid.
63. War Diary of W.G. Hudson, 33.
66. Memorandum to Chief Engineer, AEF, 6 September 1918, NA, RG 120, World War I, Organizational Records—42nd Division, Box 40—117th Engineer Regiment, Folder—117th Engineers History, 1.
67. Memorandum to Chief Engineer, AEF, 6 October 1918, NA, RG 120, World War I, Organizational Records—42nd Division, Box 40—117th Engineer Regiment, Folder—117th Engineers History, 1.
69. Reilly, Americans All, 532.
70. Father Francis P. Duffy, Father Duffy’s Story: A Tale of Humor and Heroism, of Life and Death with the Fighting Sixty-Ninth (New York: George H. Doran Co., 1919), 234.
71. Narratives of Leland L. Whitney, 166th Infantry Regiment Concerning World War I Service, UNLA, RDC, RDVA, Individual Papers, Box 8, Folder 1, 25.
73. Tompkins, Story of the Rainbow, 117.
74. 42nd Division: Summary of Operations in the World War, 40.
76. Tompkins, Story of the Rainbow, 112.
77. Ibid., 115–16.
78. The best study of the Meuse-Argonne Offensive is Paul F. Braim, The Test of Battle: The American Expeditionary Forces in the Meuse-Argonne Campaign (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1987). For the movement of the 42nd Division to the area, see Cooke, Rainbow Division, 164.
79. Memorandum to Chief Engineer, AEF, 6 September 1918, NA, RG 120, World War I, Organizational Records—42nd Division, Box 40—117th Engineer Regiment, Folder—117th Engineers History, 1–2.
82. Duffy, Father Duffy’s Story, 265.
83. Reilly, Americans All, 663.
84. Cooke, Rainbow Division, 176.
86. Sherwood, Diary of a Rainbow Veteran, 161.
88. “With the Rainbow Division in France,” Therapeutic Digest 14: 3 (July 1919), 12.
89. Cooke, Rainbow Division, 187.
90. Duffy, Father Duffy’s Story, 290.
92. No. 34, 6 November 1918 in United States Army in the World War, 1917–1919, Volume 9, 389.
93. 42nd Division: Summary of Operations in the World War, 91.
95. “Johnson Engineers Landed in New York Late Monday,” The Marion Star, 30 April 1918, 1.
Since beginning the research for this paper, my focus has broadened from the personal experiences of Shannon Faulkner (August 1995) and Nancy Ruth Mace (1996–1999) in the Corps of Cadets at The Citadel, South Carolina’s state-supported military college, to exploring existing models of a military education for women. It should be emphasized that the admission of women to military schools is the result of the changing perceptions of women’s competencies and potential contributions to American society since World War II (in 1942, the first class of the Women’s Army Corps received commissions at Fort Des Moines, Iowa). During the past sixty years, all military schools have experienced profound sociological changes, even as they clung to their revered traditions. On the one hand, by the 1970s, many of them underwent transformation from being all-male and all-military to including women and a large civilian student body—the land-grant and state-supported Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (Virginia Tech) and the Texas Agricultural and Mechanical (A&M) University, and the private Norwich University in Vermont for example. On the other, there are the all-military schools that steadfastly fought to remain all-male—the United States service academies, The Citadel, and the Virginia Military Institute. Although women have proven they can survive—and some even triumph—in both models, a strong case can also be made that women cadets have initially fared better in the less rigid institutional cultures of Virginia Tech, Texas A&M, and Norwich University.

Single gender bonding has provided a viable model for women’s entry into military life. Almost thirty years ago, in 1973, sophomore Cheryl Butler McDonald became the first African American woman to join the Corps of Cadets at Virginia Tech. In her November 1998 oral interview, she expressed gratitude for the experience, which, she said “made me focus on my studies, made me focus on discipline and growing up and being responsible.” She became “a stronger person” by developing “the mental toughness” to deal “with different pressures” imposed by the Corps of Cadets. She also accepted “more physical challenges” by joining the women’s track team.

McDonald attributed the admission of women in 1973 to two reasons: first, the corps was losing male members, and second, under the influence of “women’s lib and all that good stuff,” the military was beginning to think of increasing the participation
of women. Not only was the corps “a very small part of Virginia Tech” because most students were civilians, but the influence of “women’s lib” allowed her to be an individual and “to push the boundaries where I can do something that is non traditional.” Sex should not disqualify individuals from undertaking a task for which “they are physically and mentally prepared for doing it, it doesn’t matter if they are male or female, black or white.” From 1976 until her retirement in 1994, she worked in an operational career field as an Air Force air weapons controller at a time when the Army still assigned women administrative jobs.

As the eldest of four children of a father who entered the Air Force as an enlisted man and of a housewife mother, McDonald had attended integrated schools on or near military bases. Although most of her family’s friends were black, she “really didn’t experience racism in the military,” until she was later stationed in the South. Supporting herself with a work-study scholarship, she initially did not think of joining the military until persuaded by a white friend (who did not join) to take the Air Force ROTC’s qualifying examination, on which she “scored fairly high.” McDonald entered the corps as a sophomore together with three white women classmates and three juniors. Approving of her decision, her father was proud she became “one of the first officers in the family—the entire extended family.” Her housewife mother, whom she admired greatly, encouraged McDonald to pursue her career choices.

The first women cadets were treated as “rats” for only a day, an experience that male freshmen had to endure for most of a year. McDonald saw the women cadets as both pioneers and “specimens,” who “were kind of put under a microscope,” though perhaps 30 percent came from military families. Assisted by a female advisor, the women had few guidelines as to whether they were “to emphasize being feminine or de-emphasize it.” They had to march in skirts and heels before they were allowed to wear pants, “the most wonderful thing,” she said. Thus, the issues McDonald had to deal with were developing an appropriate uniform, make-up, and hair style (the Air Force allowed women’s hair length down to the collar edge or neatly worn up). Having less demanding physical standards than the men, women had to run a mile and a half to the men’s two miles. Some of the men “were really resentful of the fact that we were in there” because they felt women were lowering the physical standards. The women did not carry equipment or weapons. Nor were they permitted to carry a senior saber or wear a senior cape.

Given the responsibility of training the incoming freshman female cadets during Cadre Week, the women sophomores and juniors in L Squadron, the women’s unit for the U.S. Air Force, took their task very seriously, said McDonald. The upper-
classmen had to put the freshmen through the “rat system,” during which they could not “be their buddies.” But in contrast to the male model at The Citadel and VMI, she emphasized: “We were not in the business of trying to make L Squadron members quit. We wanted to keep as many girls as we could because we knew we were small and we were trying to build something here and not tear it down.” McDonald never got “pied,” a punishment usually reserved for the “most hated”; “Pie Day” allowed the cadets to let off steam. Because they lived on the first floor of a single-gender dormitory for civilian women and were isolated from male cadets, except for eating in the same dining room, L Squadron soon became “closer than any squadron or company in the Corps.” She appreciated the support her squadron received from the professor of aerospace studies, the Air Force ROTC, Commandant George Walsh, and the regimental staff. The Army ROTC seemed less open to having women. Moreover, L Squadron won acceptance from the corps its first year, when it was applauded for marching with precision. For McDonald, “the first time that someone was appreciative of us was really the turning point for me feeling accepted into the Corps.” During her year as commander, the L Squadron won the Kohler Prize for precision drilling, and it placed second or third for its piece on the Wizard of Oz in the skit-night competition. In retrospect, however, McDonald felt that if Virginia Tech and the Corps of Cadets “had more things planned out before we got there, I think it would’ve helped a lot.”

The “honor” of commanding L Squadron as a junior “was challenging,” occasionally “frustrating,” but “fun at times,” though its demands led her to switch majors from time-consuming mathematics to more flexible art courses. Although L Squadron was sometimes given too much advice by other squadrons on how to conduct itself, McDonald personally did not have a problem with other commanders, who “recognized I had leadership.” “We were bound and determined that our male counterparts were not going to find anything wrong with our freshman system,” she said. Her greatest difficulty was internal—dealing with an executive officer the girls disliked, who smoked heavily, was “very abrasive,” and gay. Wanting to make L Squadron “look good,” McDonald strove to establish “a good atmosphere in the squadron, and to treat people like people,” respecting differences as she dealt with complaints. Her senior year, she was administrative officer and handled paperwork; she roomed with the new commander, a junior.

Because of the civil rights movement, McDonald felt gender was a more important issue than race, though race was occasionally raised with black male cadets. She dated a black male cadet but did not feel “camaraderie” along racial lines. Nor did she see herself as “a pioneer” until after she graduated as the first black female
Of more importance to McDonald than being “the first black female in the Corps” was being among the first women in the corps. “It was more I don’t want you here because you’re female as opposed to you’re black,” she emphasized. Her mother, who had dropped out of college when her own father became ill and then married at eighteen or nineteen, “was really pleased that I went into the military because I was doing something she wasn’t able to do back then cause her career choices were even more limited than mine when I came out in 1976.” Neither race nor gender, McDonald believed, should be barriers to her desire to follow a career and life not traditional to a woman. Although occasionally treated as a racial minority by civilians, the only segregation that McDonald saw in the military “was between officer and enlisted not between black and white, or non-white and white.”

When asked whether it would have been better if women had been integrated into the male units in 1973, McDonald thought “it probably would’ve made the whole process easier, the acceptance of us into the Corps a little easier,” but in “L Squadron we got to form our identity and establish the fact that women really could be a legitimate part of the Corps, and we got to do it our way.” Having won “the respect and their trust,” it was “easier when the integration finally did happen when they put the women into the individual units,” because immediate integration “could’ve failed just like the women at VMI and the Citadel. . . .” The first halfway integration occurred when women living in the L Squadron area were assigned to the Highty Tighties. Once that decision was made, McDonald thought these women should have been allowed to participate fully in all Highty Tights’ activities, so they would feel they belonged to the unit, because cadets developed loyalty “to your buds, your unit, and your Corps, kind of in that order.”

McDonald felt it would be “a lot harder for a female” at The Citadel and Virginia Military Institute because they required all regular, daytime male students to be in their Corps of Cadets and were so dedicated to their traditions of male bonding. But they should also make allowances, she said, “for the individuality and the fact that there are legitimate differences between males and females.” But when VMI talked to Virginia Tech’s women cadets, then about 17 percent, “all they took was the negative stuff. They didn’t take any of the positive stuff at all.” Both VMI and The Citadel needed, observed McDonald, “to change the attitude of the leadership,” in order to “change the attitude of the Corps.” It would take them some time, she thought, to achieve the level of integrating women that had occurred at the military service academies.

The well-endowed Texas Agricultural and Mechanical (A&M) University followed a path similar to Virginia Tech’s by admitting women to its corps ten years
after first admitting them as civilian students. Membership in the Corps of Cadets became voluntary for men in 1965. Initially assigned to their own units under male leaders, the women in time developed their own leaders. Texas A&M’s 2000 cadets today constitute “the largest uniformed body of students in the nation outside the U.S. service academies.” Another military school pioneering a coeducational model was the private Norwich University, originally chartered in 1819. It admitted women to its Corps of Cadets in 1974, two years after merging with Vermont College, which had educated women since 1834. Thus, Norwich University had established both a coeducational and a non-military base, which presumably made it less difficult for women seeking admission to its Corps of Cadets. Indeed, the training mandated for its Corps of Cadets states: “While proper conduct, obedience to orders, and compliance with Regulations are required, there is no activity that would subject a rook to humiliation or indignity.”

Under a congressional order, West Point, the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis, and the U.S. Air Force Academy in Colorado began admitting women in 1976. Today, they graduate about six hundred women annually, many of whom have faced and survived difficult gender battles. Of the 120 women admitted to West Point’s class of 1980—about 8.5 percent—only about one-half graduated. “They did their best to make as many of those women quit as they possibly could,” noted historian Richard Atkinson; “for women it was a trial by double fire.” Lieutenant Colonel Carol Barkalow, who had entered at seventeen, remembered: “Some days it was easy, other days was as hard as hell.” Some days she wanted quit. As women cadets walked past upperclassmen, it was common to hear in response to their “Good morning, sir,” “Well, it was a good morning until you got here, bitch.” Barkalow said there were “three groups of guys”: “guys who were actively against us”; “guys who really didn’t care”; “and then we had our supporters, we had guys who truly came to our defense.” Barkalow answered her personal question of whether she should be at West Point: “You bet we should be here,” just as much as the men. Nevertheless, for four years, the first women cadets felt very much like blacks did at segregated lunch counters. “It was a very disheartening experience,” observed Mary Whitley, although it had “many good things.” “I wouldn’t want to recommend being the first class of women to go to West Point, because it was very difficult,” she said. “Graduation day from West Point was the happiest day of my life. And it still is.”

Such comments were no doubt also thought, if not spoken, by the first women to enter the Corps of Cadets at The Citadel and at VMI. In light of the experiences the first women had in other military schools, why did not The Citadel and VMI, which did make some effort, really try to change the way they operated their initiation of
entering freshmen? One wonders, even in 2001, how much intellectual and cultural transformation has occurred at The Citadel since Shannon Faulkner reported on campus, under the order of U.S. District Judge C. Weston Houck, on Saturday morning, 12 August 1995, along with almost six hundred freshman? Faulkner had attended daytime classes at The Citadel under a January 1994 court order because there was no comparable military training program for her anywhere in South Carolina. Rejecting the nascent alternative leadership program for women at Converse College, the judge ruled that The Citadel had to obey the order of the U.S. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals to admit Faulkner to its Corps of Cadets. Much to the resentment of Citadel men, concessions were made to Faulkner: less strict guidelines on physical conditioning; a short, but not a crew cut haircut; surveillance cameras monitoring her single bedroom with a private bathroom in the Law Barracks; special security locks on her door; and the monitoring of her reception on campus by federal marshals. Faulkner did want to be reassigned to the same barracks used by members of the band if she was accepted as a flutist.19

The two-and-one-half years of stress, combined with the high temperatures and humidity, caught up with Faulkner on Friday, 18 August 1995. Outside the infirmary where she had spent Thursday night, she announced that she was withdrawing from The Citadel, on what “has been the hardest day of my life.” Having missed almost all of “hell week,” she knew she could never make up that experience, even if she eventually passed the fitness tests. Faulkner did not see herself as “quitting” but rather as “taking a personal medical leave.” There was no “dishonor in leaving . . . I think there is dis-justice in me staying and killing myself.” She expressed the hope that “next year, a whole group of women will be going in, . . . because maybe it would have been different if those other women had been with me.” Citadel president General Claudius (“Bud”) E. Watts III was relieved because he felt “Faulkner’s presence posed a challenge for us and created a distraction.” When Faulkner’s father and brother came to pick her up, male cadets celebrated by “Wa-hooing” and venting the Rebel yell. A group of seventy-five upperclassmen in a circle did push-ups in the rain to an indistinguishable chant. On the way to mess hall that evening they chanted:

Marching down the avenue!
Now we know that Faulkner’s through!
I am happy and so are you!
Marching down the avenue!20

Like The Citadel (1842), the 157-year-old Virginia Military Institute in Lexington, the nation’s oldest state-supported military college (1839), had proudly been
an all-male school since its founding. On 26 June 1996, in United States v. Virginia, 94 to 1941, the Supreme Court ruled seven to one, with Justice Antonin Scalia dissenting (and Justice Clarence Thomas recused, since his son attended VMI), that state-supported male-only education at VMI violated women applicants’ constitutional rights under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Writing for the majority, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, a liberal feminist, argued that women should have equal access to the same educational opportunities as men unless an “‘exceedingly persuasive justification’” existed. No women would be admitted to VMI before the fall of 1997 since the class of 2000 was full, and it had no active applications from women. Unlike The Citadel, however, VMI would carefully prepare in a technical sense for the admission of its first women, even developing an exchange program with Norwich and Texas A & M.21

Two days after the Supreme Court ended male-only education at VMI, The Citadel’s Board of Visitors unanimously voted to admit women to its Corps of Cadets—after spending, together with the state of South Carolina, $3,240,000 trying to keep them out. The Citadel made some plans for the admission of women but really did not address ways of changing the hostile attitudes that many cadets and alumni felt toward it. Although The Citadel followed the Justice Department’s suggestion to bring in students from coeducational military schools on an exchange program, it had recruited only two cadets from Norwich and Texas A &M. In August 1996, four women enrolled in The Citadel’s 1900-man corps: Nancy Ruth Mace, Kim Messer, Petra Lovetinska, and Jeanie Mentavlos. Messer proved to be a difficult and sloppy roommate for Mace; and Lovetinska would have preferred to room with Mace rather than Mentavlos. Moreover, as knobs, the four soon faced not only the usual “racking” by upperclassmen but also problems such as serious hazing, even sexual harassment. On her way to the library one evening in mid-November 1996, Mace was told by a menacing upperclassman: “‘You—are-a-piece of shit! Leave-my-school!’” For Mace, however, “failure would be a kind of death, the death of every hope I had for self-respect.” She set her “face in stone” and “would never look back.” Mace found comfort in prayer, her family, and a few decent male cadets. In mid-December, however, the corps experienced “the biggest scandal since Shannon Faulkner had left The Citadel.”22

Charging that male cadets set her sweat shirt on fire, punished her more harshly than other knobs, and made sexual comments, Jeanie Mentavlos moved off campus with Kim Messer. Mace was interrogated about what she knew and given, as was Lovetinska, a cellular phone; both had “panic buttons” put in their rooms to call guards, if needed. Mentavlos and Messer resigned in January 1997 and initiated lawsuits. In March, The Citadel punished nine male cadets and expelled one
for hazing and harassment; that August, The Citadel announced that there would be “Zero Tolerance for Hazing.” Messer settled her sexual harassment lawsuit against The Citadel for $33,750 in 1998. In November 1999, The Citadel settled Mentavlos’s sexual harassment suit for $100,000 and no admission of liability against it and Captain Richard Ellis, a former ROTC instructor at the school. Mentavlos, who argued that The Citadel “conspired with five male cadets to keep her from getting a military education equal to that of male cadets” by treating her “worse than male cadets because the school did not want women in the corps of cadets,” also settled with two of the five she charged with harassment.23

Volunteering to serve on committees as a way of helping The Citadel “improve the Assimilation Plan for Women,” Mace dealt with issues such as uniforms, sexual harassment, and menstruation. She gained “a sense of power, of control, that helped me get through the hard times in the battalion,” and saw it as a way of helping incoming women cadets. Mace completed her challenging year as a knob after enduring the grueling exercising, running and drilling of Recognition Day in late May 1998. But being welcomed as a cadet by upperclassmen did not end her sense of isolation. Indeed, she acknowledged that during her second year she “felt more alone than ever,” though she became cadet sergeant the second semester. She subsequently rose to academic officer for Band Company. Even the Ring Ceremony in October 1998, when she received her senior class ring a year ahead of others who entered in 1996 because of courses taken at Trident Tech, made her “a nervous wreck.” She feared being booed. Indeed, she was hissed by the parents of other cadets, who, when ordered to remain silent, “glared.” Yet despite “all the pain and bigotry I had suffered,” she wrote, “I would not have traded that ring, or my three years in the Corps, for anything in the world.” When, on 8 May 1999, retired Brigadier General James Emory Mace, Jr., 1963, The Citadel’s most decorated living alumnus, presented his daughter her bachelor of science degree in business administration, magna cum laude, Nancy Mace became the first woman cadet to graduate, joining 368 male cadets. But had The Citadel really changed its views on women cadets by then? To be sure, significant changes occurred during her father’s term as Commandant of Cadets, which began in late February 1998, including the improved discipline and the admission of more women. Moreover, his daughter could take satisfaction that she “had proven” herself “in a man’s world” and “had done it without giving up my womanhood.” On 19 May 1999, the South Carolina General Assembly passed a resolution commending Mace as “the prototype of the Citadel woman” because of “her leadership, exemplary conduct, and outstanding achievements while a cadet at The Citadel.”24

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Attitudes still need to change more profoundly at The Citadel because women are still resented for not conforming to male standards and for weakening male bonding. Indeed, alumni were and are among those least accepting of the women. For example, some Citadel and VMI alumni, organized by VMI alumnus Mike Guthrie, began to raise money for a private male military college. The Southern Military Institute "would be an 'overtly politically incorrect institution,' a Christian college that would emphasize military traditions of the Confederacy." Ultimately, it failed to attract sufficient funding to open a viable alternative to either VMI or The Citadel.25

Meanwhile, the best protection for women cadets is a steady increase in their numbers, so they can look out for each other. In the fall of 1997, The Citadel admitted 20 women, 17 of whom survived their freshman year, including Mandy Garcia, the first woman to win an athletic scholarship. In November 1997, the Association of Citadel Men renamed itself The Citadel Alumni Association. According to The Citadel’s enrollment statistics by gender, the number of women in the corps of Cadets has continued to rise: fall 1998, 34 female freshmen out of 534; 13 female sophomores out of 376; and 2 juniors out of 384. By spring 1998 there were 28 female and 451 male freshmen still enrolled. The corresponding figures for the fall of 1999 were: 32 female (out of 41 admitted) and 550 male freshmen; 25 female and 393 male sophomores; 11 female and 371 male juniors; and 1 female and 369 male seniors. By the spring of 2000 there were 26 female and 496 male freshmen; 24 female and 394 male sophomores; 11 female and 363 male juniors; and 1 female and 329 male seniors. In the fall of 2000 there were 26 female and 568 male freshmen; 20 female and 426 male sophomores; 23 females and 361 male juniors; and 10 female and 364 male seniors. By the spring of 2001 there were 25 female and 532 male freshmen; 23 female and 442 male sophomores; 23 female and 364 male juniors; and 10 female and 326 male seniors. Finally, by fall 2001, The Citadel enrolled in the Corps of Cadets 33 female and 583 male freshmen; 21 female and 463 male sophomores; 21 female and 416 male juniors; and 23 female and 374 male seniors. Tabulating total female enrollment in the Corps of Cadets from fall 1996 to fall 2001, it rose from 4 (0.2 percent) in 1996; to 20 (1.2 percent) in 1997; to 49 (2.9 percent) in 1998; to 69 (3.9 percent) in 1999; to 79 (4.4 percent) in 2000; and to 98 (5.1 percent) in 2001. In the U.S. military services academies’ first year of coeducation, the percentage of women enrolled ranged from 8.5 percent at West Point, to 7 percent at the U.S. Naval Academy, and 11 percent at the U.S. Air Force Academy. Today, those percentages range from 15 to 18 percent. Virginia Tech’s Corps of Cadets is 17 percent female; and Norwich University is about 15 percent. The highest percentage of women—30 percent—is to be found in the U.S. Coast Guard Academy.26
According to Laura Fairchild Brodie, author of *Breaking Out: VMI and the Coming of Women* (2000), “events at The Citadel provided a cautionary tale.” Because The Citadel was skewered by Ed Bradley in a *Sixty Minutes* probe, VMI worked hard to dispel from the public mind the inevitable linking of the two military colleges.27 On the one hand, “Citadel graduates tend to credit their school with being more rigorous, militarily and academically, than VMI, while Institute cadets counter that what passes for rigor at The Citadel is in fact a culture of sadism, where ritualistic hazing is ingrained in daily life.” The citizens of both states, Brodie conceded, thought they were more civilized in behavior. Because of its small size, VMI included some sixteen hundred people in its orientation sessions.28

The state of Virginia had provided a “start-up budget” of $5,200,000 to VMI compared with the less than one million provided by South Carolina to The Citadel, which evidently needed little money for construction.29 VMI’s Orientation Committee focused on four issues: “fraternization, hazing, new assimilation policies, and, above all else, sexual harassment.” Because of the Tailhook scandal and charges of sexual harassment at Aberdeen Proving Ground and at The Citadel, VMI addressed that potential problem but resisted the concept of “sensitivity training.” At the beginning of each orientation session, VMI’s superintendent, Major General Josiah Bunting III, ordered the showing of excerpts from the *Sixty Minutes* show on The Citadel.30 “With its orientation sessions,” said Brodie, “VMI hoped to encourage cadets to question behaviors that they had long taken for granted, and to envision the standards of conduct that ideally should prevail at a military college.” During this period, the Department of Justice followed closely what VMI was doing to admit women and make them welcome. Some of the press, however, including an editorial, “Taking VMI Prisoner,” in the *Wall Street Journal* (3 June 1997), thought the Justice Department went too far in making demands for detailed information.31

Implementing a nine to eight vote of its Board of Visitors, VMI admitted 66 women, out of 91 female applicants, and 786 men to the class of 2001. Thirty women, 17 on partial or full academic scholarships, and 427 men, 38 of whom received similar scholarships, matriculated in August 1997. None of the women admitted were either alumni daughters or granddaughters although about one-third had a military parent or family member. VMI used scholarships to recruit two women from New Mexico Military Institute, a junior college founded by a VMI graduate: Melissa Graham (class of 1999) and Mia Utz (class of 2001) came as transfer students with U.S. Army Reserve commissions. When Graham, who saw herself “first and foremost” as “a member of the Corps and proud to be so,” and Chih-Yuan Ho, from the Republic of China, who wanted “to be remembered as a VMI graduate period not as a woman
who graduated from VMI,” became the first two female graduates in May 1999, some of their 223 male classmates felt they “had not paid their dues.” Nevertheless, VMI had found “a few good women,” as Brodie observed, “women who could acclimate themselves to a method of education specifically designed for men.”

In addition to relying on the “dyke system,” under which first class cadets served as mentors to help women make it through the ratline, VMI invited eight women and two men as exchange students from Texas A&M and Norwich universities. But some VMI first classmen resented any interference from the exchange students, becoming possessive about the female rats: “‘These are our women. Keep away.’” Indeed, VMI cadets boasted “that their Barracks was more spartan, their Honor Code more stringent, and their ratline more brutal than anything faced at Norwich or A&M.” At least one A&M student felt she played useful role as a “lightning rod” for the anger of VMI’s male cadets at the decision to admit women: “‘I’d rather them abuse me, make rumors about me, and pin me down for things I didn’t do or say, than taking it out on the girls. That goes back to the whole reason that I am here. I wish somebody had done that for my school.’” VMI’s female rats, however, did not always appreciate their presence. Indeed, by the fall semester’s end, said Brodie, “it was VMI’s women, not its men, who had become especially antagonistic toward the exchange students—criticizing them, snubbing them, refusing to call them ma’am.” Some felt that the exchange program was unnecessary, believing that VMI “could handle coeducation without help.” Others, unaware that the exchange students had been told by VMI’s upperclassmen not to interfere, “felt personally insulted when they saw the women from Norwich and A&M keeping their distance.” But VMI’s female rats were also jealous of the exchange students’ freedom to look feminine and to make friends with the upperclass cadets. “‘Those are our first classmen,’ one female rat insisted, complaining about the flirtatiousness of a few exchange students.” On other hand, VMI cadets who went as exchange students to Texas A&M and Norwich universities “were being treated like royalty,” while their visitors were denied the privilege of marching with bayonets fixed during weekly parades at VMI.

Brodie emphasized that women cadets would find it difficult to maintain “a sense of feminine identity in a predominantly male world.” To become “a female Brother Rat” took personal “sacrifices.” The future of women at VMI would be determined after seven months on the ratline, which ended after “Resurrection,” their final week of physical and mental challenges. Rats completed a fifteen-mile midnight march and then crawled and climbed up muddy “Breakout Hill,” on 16 March 1998. Those accepted as cadets included 361 of the 430 men who had matriculated in August 1997 and 23 of the 30 women. Astute observers realized, moreover, that
VMI’s first female rats, as upperclassmen, would be as tough as the male upperclassmen on incoming rats. According to Brodie, “it would be easier for the Institute to produce a female rat than to create a ‘VMI Woman.’” Because “the ratline was designed to downplay gender differences, along with differences in class and ethnicity,” it aimed to mold “the rats into one predominantly masculine group.” After the ratline ended, “the distinctions between men and women would emerge more clearly.”

Female sophomores, however, could no longer count on the “dyke system” for “big brothers to fight the women’s battles.” VMI administrators were cautioned by those from other military colleges that “crises were more likely to come in subsequent years, as VMI became complacent and as its women became less tolerant of the daily struggle for respect in a masculine culture.” The sophomore women could only hope that “conscientious male peers” would continue “to speak out when they saw problems arise.” Otherwise, they would be quite alone. In 2001, two years after the first two women graduated, VMI’s first truly coeducational class received its diplomas. One of its outstanding women was Erin Claunch, daughter of an Air Force pilot, who chose to attend VMI on a full four-year scholarship instead of the U.S. Air Force Academy. On 15 February 2001, the Virginia General Assembly presented Senate Joint Resolution 412 to Claunch, a physics major and Cadet 2nd battalion commander, and to Charles Bunting, class president and a son of VMI Superintendent Bunting.

After enrolling only 28 women in the fall of 1999, VMI began to attract significantly more inquiries from women—4,463 out of a total of 19,315 for the class of 2005. In the fall of 2001, VMI admitted 79 out of the 100 female applicants and 780 out of 1,313 male applicants. It anticipated that 415 would matriculate, in keeping with the Board of Visitors’ decision to limit the “Rat” class to about 400 to ameliorate overcrowded barrack conditions and to enroll students with higher SATs (a mean score of 1125). Not until 8 December 2001, however, about seven months after VMI had graduated its first truly coeducational class, did the lawsuit initiated by the federal government in 1990 end. In accepting the joint dismissal motion filed by both the U.S. Justice Department and state Attorney General’s Office, Judge Jackson Kiser of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Virginia agreed that “the Commonwealth parties have met their obligation under the Remand Order ‘to formulate, adopt, and implement a plan that conforms with the Equal Protection Clause’ of the United States Constitution.” Superintendent Bunting felt that “the VMI family” had been vindicated in its program to assimilate women, “without compromising the Institute’s core values.”

Meanwhile, the Virginia Women’s Institute for Leadership (VWIL) at Mary Baldwin College seemed to offer to some women a more supportive alternative to VMI. VWIL, still state-supported though no longer receiving funding from VMI, had
graduated 22 women in 1999, 24 in 2000, and 25 in 2001. After two years of implementing VMI’s “transition to coeducation,” Colonel N. Michael Bissell, a 1961 VMI graduate and decorated combat pilot in Vietnam, had returned full-time to VWIL as its commandant. “After their school’s long struggle to remain all-male,” observed Brodie, “the legacy of VMI’s legal battle seemed to be that Virginia would offer single-sex military education to its daughters, but not its sons.” Mary Baldwin’s short-lived counterpart at Converse College no longer had support from the State of South Carolina or from The Citadel, but it still prepares “women to be strong leaders in their professions and in their communities.”

If a lesson emerges from this survey it is that all models for a military education for women have their flaws, largely because women’s inclusion in military institutions and units is relatively so new that the inherent gender conflicts have yet to be satisfactorily resolved. Even twenty-six years after the admission of women to Texas A&M’s Corps of Cadets, one woman exchange student acknowledged while at VMI that “our problems are far from being solved.” On the other hand, evidence suggests that, in military colleges as in traditional colleges, women’s separate space can be a positive experience as a transitional measure into full coeducation. Both historically separate women’s colleges and historically black colleges and universities have trained more female and black professionals, respectively, than either coeducational colleges or historically white colleges that admitted African Americans.

Nevertheless, military women progressed within the army since the disestablishment of the Women’s Army Corps on 2 October 1978. According to Joshua S. Goldstein’s War and Gender: How Gender Shapes the War System and Vice Versa (2001), “the Gulf War was a big victory for liberal feminism,” with close to forty thousand women constituting 6 percent of U.S. forces. They “participated in large numbers, and performed capably, and the public proved willing to accept women soldiers as casualties and POWs.” The Army treats women just as “soldiers,” neither attempting “to avoid assigning one or two women alone to a unit of several hundred soldiers,” nor training “male soldiers effectively to work with women better.” Moreover, “military studies” show “that men and women work together well when women are not a novelty in a unit.” But as women enter positions previously closed to them, they again become “a novelty,” which occurs in “each entering class at the academies, and in basic training.” For both men and women, as their “unit works together, however, and especially if it deploys in the field, unit bonding appears to overcome gender divisions to a great extent.” The key seems to be implementing what it will take for men to stop seeing military women as “novelties” who have gone AWOL from their traditional sphere.
ENDNOTES

1. Fifth District Congresswoman Edith Nourse Rogers of Massachusetts sponsored the bill establishing the Women’s Army Auxiliary Corps on 15 May 1942. Under Public Law 110 (1 July 1943), the WAC gained full military status, becoming the Women’s Army Corps, effective 30 September 1943 (Edith Nourse Rogers Papers, Box 13, folder 169, 1944 speech Re: WAAC to WAC, Schlesinger Library, Cambridge, Massachusetts.


11. Cheryl Butler McDonald Interview by Tamara Kennelly, 28 November 1998, Transcript, Part 1 [of 3], Black Women at Virginia Tech Oral History Project, First Black Woman in the Corps of...
13. Cheryl Butler McDonald Interview by Tamara Kennelly, 28 November 1998, Transcript, Part 3 [of 3], Black Women at Virginia Tech Oral History Project, First Black Woman in the Corps of Cadets. http://spec.lib.vt.edu/bwhp/cheryl/cheryl3.htm, pp. 3,4,5,6; 1–7. McDonald concluded her interview by saying: “I would like every American to have that opportunity to go and see the different cultures in the state because they may be a lot more tolerant of the differences in people if they got exposed to them and realized that they are not bad things they are just different” (7).
16. Texas A&M University, Corps of Cadets, “About the Corps,” and “From College to University,” http://www.aggiecorps.org/home/about/history/university. The Aggie Band fully integrated women by 1985; Squadron 15 was the first unit that fully integrated women in 1989. “In Fulfillment of a Dream, African Americans at Texas A&M University,” an exhibit, with Chronology, http://library.tamu.edu/cushing/online/ africanamerican/chronology/index.html. In 1974, Gail Sedberry was the first black woman cadet. Texas A&M’s $4,000,000,000 endowment placed it tenth on the list of the most heavily endowed American universities in 2001 (“Harvard,” Cover Story, Business Week, 18 February 2002, 78. Texas A&M has faced problems of attrition among its women cadets, who had the option of continuing their studies as civilian students (Brodie, Breaking Out, 90).
17. “Training the Corps of Cadets at Norwich University,” file:///C|training.html; and Norwich University Images of Its Past,” “Chronology,” file:///C|/history.html. Norwich admitted 8 women and 906 men in 1974–1975. By the late 1990s, women cadets at Norwich University constituted “fifteen percent, which is roughly the proportion of women that most military colleges can hope to attract today” (Brodie, Breaking Out, 89).


27. Brodie, Breaking Out, 167. A Ph.D. in English Literature, Brodie, a self-described feminist, had
taught English part-time to male cadets at the Virginia Military Institute. As the wife of the band director, she traveled to its concerts and attended numerous VMI functions. With the permission of VMI Superintendent Major General Josiah Bunting III, who invited her to join the committee on coeducation, Brodie conducted 66 interviews with cadets, administrators, faculty and staff, and visited cadets at VMI, Norwich, and Texas A&M universities.

29. Ibid., 48–49.
30. Ibid., 173; 180.
31. Ibid., 184, 186–87.
35. Ibid., 277, 344.
40. Brodie, Breaking Out, 298–99. According to Brodie, Texas A&M’s corps still suffered “the pains of an especially difficult transition to coeducation, marred by the school’s original decision to place the women in separate units and separate dorms, and later aggravated by sexual harassment scandals.”
4. Joshua S. Goldstein, War and Gender: How Gender Shapes the War System and Vice Versa (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 94, 95, 99, 100, 199–203. Constituting about 10 percent in 1997 of American peacekeeping forces in Bosnia, women felt they “had `easygoing and untroubled` relations with the men.” Wearing protective gear, their gender was usually disguised, with the result that women MPs even temporarily deceived an infantry colonel (99). Perhaps to increase their acceptance, some women acted like male soldiers by “swearing, smoking cigars,” and “firing guns.” A woman Lieutenant Colonel in command of a Military Police battalion, observed: “If a woman thinks like a warrior, believes she’s a warrior, then she’ll do what it takes. Most women don’t think they have it in them, but once you let that spirit loose you find that
aggressiveness” (Goldstein, 100; Dana Priest, “Engendering a Warrior Spirit,” Washington Post, 3 March 1997). As of 1998, the military services restricted women from one in six jobs (http://www.feminist.org/911/sexharnews_military.html).
A Notice to Contributors Concerning Style

The editorial committee invites submission of manuscripts from authors of papers presented at the annual meeting. On the recommendation of reviewers and editors, manuscripts may be published in The Proceedings of the South Carolina Historical Association.

In general, manuscripts should not exceed 4500 words, about eighteen pages (double-spaced) including endnotes. As soon as possible after the annual meeting, authors should submit two paper copies and one electronic copy to the editor for review. The electronic copy must be submitted on a PC-compatible diskette written in MS Word 6.0+ for Windows or WordPerfect 5.2+ for Windows. The electronic text should be flush left, unformatted, single spaced, and saved as “text only.” Paginate your paper, double space the text, and indent the first word of a new paragraph only on the paper copy. All copies should use 12 point type in the Times New Roman font. Do not include a title page, but instead place your title and name at the top of the first page. Please use margins of one inch throughout your paper and space only once between sentences. Indent five spaces without quotation marks all quotations five or more lines in length.

Documentation should be provided in endnotes, not at the foot of each page. At the end of the text of your paper double-space, then type the word “endnote” centered between the margins. List endnotes in Arabic numerical sequence, each number followed by a period and space, and then the text of the endnote. Endnotes should be flush left and lines single-spaced. If your word-processing program demands the raised footnote numeral, it will be acceptable. Foreign words and titles of books or journals should be italicized. For the rest, The Proceedings of the South Carolina Historical Association adheres in matters of general usage to the fourteenth edition of The Chicago Manual of Style.
The South Carolina Historical Association held its seventy-second annual meeting in the Stern Center, College of Charleston, Charleston SC, on 2 March 2002. Registration ran from 8:30 until 10:00 A.M. in the Stern Center Ballroom.

Session 1: (9.30–10:45 A.M.)

B. Literary Remains: Poetry and Journals

C. The World Is Not As It Seems

Morning coffee break was held from 10:45 until 11:00

Session 2: (11:00 A.M.–12:15 P.M.)
A. Carolina Universities

B. Carolina Power

C. Scalawags
Construction of a Confederate Memory: Richard McIlwaine’s Memories of Threescore Years and Ten. " Chair: Ken Peters

**Luncheon and business meeting (12:30–2:15 p.m.)**

At 1:05 P.M., following lunch in the Stern Center ballroom, the meeting was called to order by SCHA President Calvin Smith.

Calvin thanked the College of Charleston for its support in hosting our annual meeting, with particular thanks to Amy McCandless, who did a wonderful job with handling the local arrangements. He also thanked the presenters and all who were in attendance, noting that their enthusiasm keeps us an active and important aspect of the profession in SC.

**Officers' reports**

**Secretary**—Ron Cox thanked the members for submitting tidbits of information for publication in the *Newsletter* and asked them to “keep them coming.”

**Treasurer**—Rodger Stroup placed copies of the financial report on each table. He asked members to share as a part of the association’s frugality program. He discussed the format of the report. The general fund includes two savings accounts and a checking account, while the others are self-explanatory. We’re down a couple of thousand dollars from last year. The cost of printing the *PROCEEDINGS* has gone up, and last year’s meeting cost more than we anticipated. However, our estimations have worked perfectly this year, and we appear to be right on target.

**Proceedings**—Steve Lowe thanked those from last year’s meeting who submitted papers and noted that the latest issue of *Proceedings* is available today. He further urged presenters to submit papers for consideration in next year’s issue.

**New business**

The Executive Board moved to increase membership dues, from $10 to $15 for regular members but to keep student dues at $5. Offered from committee, the motion required no second. The chair asked for discussion; there was none, and the membership approved the motion.

**Announcements**

The SCHA 2003 Meeting will be held at the SC Department of Archives & History in Columbia.

**Keynote address**

Calvin Smith then introduced Dr. Dan Carter, who spoke on “Returning to South Carolina.” Dr Carter reflected on his early years in the Palmetto State, discussing the connections between personal history and textbook history.
He also noted the role of the historian as a teacher, explaining that we all are looking for a way to try to connect history to our students’ lives and experiences. Our challenge to see if we can do this without becoming “historical preachers of the gospels” or “scolders.”

Additional business

Nominations
The Nominating Committee offered the following slate of officers for the 2002–2003 year:

President – Linda Hayner
Vice President – Tracy Power
Secretary – Ron Cox
Treasurer – Rodger Stroup
Robin Copp — At large
Sam Thomas — At large
Bernard Powers — At large
Steve Lowe – Editor of Proceedings

With no additional nominations from the floor, the membership accepted the slate by acclamation.

Prize committees
Calvin Smith also noted that we need two prize committees for coming year — one to judge graduate papers, and another to judge papers submitted by regular member/non-student members. Anyone interested in volunteering should contact Calvin Smith or Linda Hayner.

[Calvin turned the podium over to Linda Hayner, who recognized Tracy Power as the one who will arrange work for next year’s meeting. Tracy has lots of new ideas for next year’s meeting.]

Additional announcements
• The SE Women’s session has been moved from Palmetto Room to Jessamine Room.
• Amy McCandless gave directions to the Avery Research Center for those who are parked in parking garage.
• Rodger Stroup announced that Senator Byrd put money in this year’s budget for teaching American history—$953,000 over three years. The Archives will administer the money. Walter Edgar and Rodger pulled together a group, who thought the focus should be elementary and secondary teachers and ways they can teach history better. The first teaching program will be this summer and is just being advertised. The number of applications is a little disappointing. There is also a five-week position for
“Master Scholar” to help staff with content. Lectures in Charleston, Columbia, and Greenville areas will carry a $12000 stipend for summer plus travel—great opportu-

Archives & History Hours—with tightness of state budget we have stretched our-
selves to keep different areas open; budget cut currently proposed in House is 6 percent on top of a 15 percent cut already made. Effective in April, reference room
will be closed nights and weekends. We will lose 17 percent of staff by the time these
cuts occur, but we have no choice. So, just to let you know for your own planning
purposes, we will be open only during regular state business hours, and this will
probably hold true for the next six to eight months.

• Tracy Power discussed his preliminary plans for next year’s annual meeting. We
are hoping to to generate more papers and are particularly interested in getting
people to see SCHA as an association in South Carolina, not only of South Carolina.
We will also seek to encourage more participation by European and non-Western
historians and scholars.

The meeting was declared adjourned at 2:10 P.M.

Session 3: 2:30–3:30 P.M.

A. Southeastern Women: Ethnicity, Gender and Politics (Panel)

Michael Morris, “Southeastern Indian Women: Gender Role Myths and Realities;”
W. Scott Poole, “The Beauty and Harmony of the Picture: Southern Womanhood, the
Lost Cause and the Aesthetic Construction of Ideology in South Carolina, 1866–1879.”
Chair: Amy McCandless

B. Carolina Laborers

Tara M. Mielnik, “The Civilian Conservation Corps in South Carolina; ” Jonathan D.
Gentry, “The Congress on Industrial Organizations’ “Operation Dixie” in South
Carolina’s Textile Industry: Lessons in Union Opposition, 1946-1951.” Chair: Ron Cox

Reception and tour of Avery Research Center (3:45- 4:30)